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Since 1994, there has been a lot of attention drawn on the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
as the most important international instrument ever negotiated in this area. TRIPS 
establishes minimum universal standards in all areas of intellectual property and the 
intention is to implement these standards globally through a strong enforcement 
mechanism established in WTO. These standards affect pharmaceuticals, which many 
countries had previously excluded from patent protection in order to produce drugs at 
reduced prices and hence contribute to the improvement of public health. But now any 
Member State must comply with these minimum standards since failure to do so will 
result to the WTO dispute settlement system. 
No extensive review of the practical implications of the TRIPS Agreement has taken 
place at the global and national levels. The main objective of this paper is to examine 
the likely impact of this agreement on anti-malarial drugs in Mozambique. Given the 
persistence of the malaria epidemic in the country and the resistance to the drugs 
being utilized for this disease there is an acknowledged need for a new drug to 
eradicate the problem. The problem is that this new drug is likely to be under patent 
and this country has relied on generic drugs for all its existence and being a Member 
of the WTO Agreement they now have to wait until patents on the required drugs 
have expired or be submissive to the more expensive original brand. 
To accomplish this objective and to ascertain the end result of the above situation, 
past experiences were a major tool. By reviewing experiences of less developed 
countries in relation to patent protection and pharmaceuticals, some conclusions were 
made possible. In order to narrow down the conclusions drawn from these country 
experiences, a study was done in the Mozambican public sector by reviewing and 
analyzing the existing laws and regulations pertaining to pharmaceuticals and patent 
protection. This was done through questionnaires and interviews of the main 
stakeholders in this area. With this information the researcher was able to describe 











phannaceutical industry as a Member of the WTO agreement in the long run. This 
study therefore, relies heavily on secondary data. 
Major findings from this study indicate that: 
• The TRIPS patent system can be expected to have a great impact on the health 
sector and may negatively affect drug prices; in tenns of increased prices of 
drugs and the availability of essential medicines for diseases most persistent in 
developing countries. 
• In the specific case of anti-malarial drugs should it be the case where drug 
companies agree to reduce prices for these drugs in Mozambique there is 
likely to be a reduction in Research and Development (R&D) on those drugs 
because they are not income generating drugs. Additionally, even if there is a 
reduction in the prices of anti-malarial drugs, this reduction will still be 
extremely marginal as compared to what the country paid for its current first 
line therapy. 
• Additionally, there could be a greater concentration of drug production in 
industrial countries rather than a transfer of technology to, or foreign direct 
investment in developing countries. 
• Tools like compulsory licenses and the expansion of generic manufacturing, as 
well as negotiations with original manufacturers can help bring down the price 
of drugs in poor countries. 
Because of the nature of the problem, Mozambique unilaterally can only do so 
much. There is a need for SADC countries to negotiate collectively in order to 
increase bargaining power in order to reduce the likely negative impact of this 
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BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
1. 0 Introduction 
International trade agreements have introduced big changes, not only in the area of 
trade, but through the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (the TRIPS Agreement), as well as in the area of intellectual property. These 
are changes that call for important decisions both from the national level to the global 
level. As a result, even the stakeholders are changing, and public health officials have 
to play an even more important role in discussions on intellectual property rights. 
Countries like Mozambique have been asked to apply their patent system at a moment 
when there is an increased concern about the impact of this system on the 
pharmaceutical area's drug prices, innovation and investment. The introduction of the 
TRIPS Agreement has brought a lot of debate as to whether developing countries will 
benefit or not from these drastic changes that they have to implement in their nations 
or whether this implementation will only be at the industrialized countries favor. 
Developing countries have therefore been requested to implement a system that has 
some critical flaws and that is highly and continuously criticized. In Mozambique, 
like many other African countries, there is an increased need for new drugs to combat 
persistent diseases and the introduction of patents will certainly have an impact on the 
availability of these drugs both in terms of prices and in terms of accessibility. 
This fact is one of the main reasons that motivated the researcher to take a more vivid 
look at where countries like Mozambique stand in terms of getting hold of the much 
needed medicines and how the patent system is likely to affect the availability of 
those drugs in the future. The main challenge for public authorities is to learn to 
manage this growing system. Some fear that globalization might just be another name 












This chapter gives the background of the study, starting with some information 
background of Mozambique. In section 1.1 we discuss the geographical background, 
section 1.2 discusses the political background, section 1.3 looks at the economic 
background. The background information is intended to give a guide to those readers 
who may not be familiar with the country. 
The second section presents a detailed discussion of the Mozambican health sector, 
with section 1.4.1 looking at how the health sector is financed, and section 1.4.2 
thoroughly looking at the health system structure and the problems faced in the health 
sector. Section 1.4.3 and 1.4.4 respectively look at the pharmaceutical sector and the 
health sector reform progress in the country. 
Finally, the last sections define the problem statement, aims and objectives of the 
study, as well as the justification of the study. The chapter concludes with the scope 
and limitations of the study. 
1.1 Geographical and socio-demographic Background 
Mozambique, with an area of about 799.380 square kilometres is densely and 
unevenly populated. It is located on the southeastern coast of Africa. It borders on 
Tanzania to the north, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe to the west and South Africa 
and Swaziland to the south. Maputo City, with a population of 1,039.6, is the capital 
of the country. 
As far as the whole country is concerned, Mozambique has a population of 
19,371,057. The estimates for this country explicitly take into account the effects of 
excess mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant 
mortality and death rates, lower population and growth rates, and changes in the 
distribution of popUlation by age and sex than would otherwise be expected. The 
1997 Mozambican census reported a population of 16,099,246 with 45.7% accounting 
for the young popUlation under 15 (National Institute of Statistics, 2000). The country 
has more women than men; 52% of the population are women and 48% are men. 
Registration of births and deaths is quite limited in Mozambique but the available 











estimates show us a population growth rate of 1.3% per year with about 70% residing 
in rural areas and living below the poverty line, depending mainly on agriculture for 
their income. Mozambique has a high rate of infant mortality; per 1000 babies born 
alive, 146 die before reaching the age of one. The rate is higher in rural areas as 
compared to urban areas, 160 and 101 respectively. 
Life expectancy at birth is about 36.45 years for the total population with females 
having less life expectancy (35.62 years) as compared to men (37.25 years). The death 
rate of about 24.21-deaths/l,000 population is mostly accounted for by the AIDS 
pandemic, with an HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of 13.22% in 1999, which was 
higher than the South African prevalence rate of 11% in 2000 (UNDP, 2000). 
According to the 1999 Health National Directorate there were about 1.2 million 
people living with HIV I AIDS at the time. 
Of the population of 7 years and above, about 62% are economically active and 38% 
are inactive with a higher percentage of the economically active found in rural areas. 
Women dominated economic activity in rural areas. At national level most of the 
population works in the agriculture, forest, and fisheries sectors. 
1.2 Political background 
Mozambique has recovered from the thirty years of turbulence. The country has 
endured three wars: the liberation struggle against the Portuguese, the involvement in 
the Rhodesian war and the South African backed internal revolution. Besides war, the 
life of ordinary Mozambicans has been shaken by other dramatic events. The country 
moved from colonial rule and protected economy to an ambitious development 
experiment along socialist lines (Pavignani, 1997). 
Almost five centuries as a Portuguese colony came to an end with independence in 
1975. Large-scale emigration by whites, economic dependence on South Africa, a 
severe drought, and a prolonged civil war hindered the country's development. The 
ruling party formally abandoned Marxism in 1989, and a new constitution the 
following year provided for multiparty elections and a free market economy. A 
United Nations negotiated peace agreement with rebel forces ended the fighting in 











1.3 Economic overview 
Before the peace accord in October 1992, Mozambique's economy was devastated by 
a prolonged civil war and socialist mismanagement. In 1994, it ranked as one of the 
poorest countries in the world. Since then, Mozambique has undertaken a series of 
economic reforms. In 1987 the Mozambican government launched an Economic and 
Social Rehabilitation Programme (ESRP), resulting in fundamental reforms of the 
system and the implantation of a market economy. The basic goal was to achieve 
financial stability at national and international level, and to reactivate the economy in 
a sustainable form, (Pavignani, 1997). 
The role of the State in the economy has thus been gradually reduced, and more space 
created for the intervention of private economic agents. The aim was to boost the 
economy while simultaneously enabling the state to concentrate its resources on 
supplying basic goods and services and implementing strategic development 
programmes. Almost all aspects of the economy have been liberalized to some extent. 
More than 900 state enterprises have been privatised. A value-added tax, introduced 
in 1999, launched the government's comprehensive tax reform program. 
There is still an increased concern about the need for reform and greater private sector 
involvement in the transportation, telecommunications, and energy sectors. Since 
1996, inflation has been low and foreign exchange rates relatively stable. Even though 
from a small base, Mozambique's economy grew at an annual 10% rate in 1997-99, 
one of the highest growth rates in the world a lot still has to change. Growth slowed 
and inflation rose in 2000 due to devastating flooding in the early part of the year. 
Mozambique's current GDP stands at US$ 56,918 and GNP per capita is estimated at 
US$ 3, 348. Over the past years the GDP growth rate has been growing at a 1.6% 
growth rate l . Being an agrarian economy, agriculture accounts for about 27.93% of 
GDP, trade accounts for 21.91%, industry accounting for 8.5%, and other sectors 
accounting for 41.46%. The main export products are cashew nuts, prawns, lobsters, 
cotton and wood; with the main export market being Spain, South Africa, USA, 
Japan, Portugal, and Malawi, (Investment promotion centre 2002). 











The country depends on foreign assistance to balance the budget and to pay for a trade 
imbalance in which imports greatly outnumber exports. The trade situation should 
improve in the medium term, however, as trade and transportation links to South 
Africa and the rest of the region have been improved and sizeable foreign investments 
are beginning to materialize. Among these investments are metal production 
(aluminum, steel), natural gas, power generation, agriculture, fishing, timber, and 
transportation services. Mozambique has received a formal cancellation of a large 
portion of its external debt through an IMF initiative and is scheduled to receive 
additional relief. (National Institute of Statistics 2001). 
With regard to sectoral economic policies, priority goes to agriculture, by which the 
majority of the population lives. In addition to rural extension, particularly geared 
towards improving post-harvest storage techniques and extending the period of 
guaranteed domestic food security, a major priority is developing a rural market. The 
aim is to create the structural and operational bases for expanding an active rural 
marketing network through infrastructure investment that will make private initiative 
in the marketing of cereals and other crops viable, thus getting them from the 
production areas to the consumer markets while at the same time guaranteeing supply 
of the inputs and consumer goods that peasants need. 
1.4 Health sedor in Mozambique 
Despite the improvement in the living standards, the economIC growth and the 
expansion of the registered healthcare services in the post-war period, the health of 
the population remains poor, illustrated by the high maternal and infant mortality rate, 
malnutrition, the extreme vulnerability to epidemics, such as malaria, cholera, 
meningitis and dysentery, and to the natural catastrophes. The transmittable diseases, 
related to either the tropical climate or the poor environmental hygiene or even to 
poverty, are the main causes of this situation. 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic with 14% of the sexually active adult popUlation considered 
to be infected is reaching catastrophic proportions. Reproduction related diseases, 
alcohol abuse and violence make the picture bleaker. The health of the popUlation 











capacity. Since the Independence, healthcare services have been provided mainly by 
the State, until 1992 as a monopoly and after that as a provider. 
1.4.1 Financing the health sector 
Government highly supports the finance of the health sector and in the period 1995-99 
it increased by 155% in real terms2• International assistance of about 80% on the other 
hand, declined to almost half the funds in 2001, which was a large blow for the 
country seeing as these contribute largely to medicine expenditures. 
The quote of the global expense funded by the international community reduced, from 
80% in 1996 to 50% in 2001. While the international support funded most of the 
investment, medication and medical equipment expenses, the government focuses on 
salaries and other current expenses. In 2001, the aggregate funding was US$9 per" 
capita (without taking private contributions into account as there are hard to estimate, 
but it is thought that they have a considerable size). From these US$9, around US$1.5 
is spent on drugs, (MoH, 2001). 
According to the Ministry of Health a substantial part of external assistance in 
Mozambique has been through projects, creating secondary effects such as equity 
problems and a destruction of the already weak accountability system. Up to this date 
the health sector in Mozambique, especially the pharmaceutical area is highly 
dependent on donor funding. The dependency of the pharmaceutical sector on donors 
deserves much consideration. In 1997 the import system of Mozambique was 
considered as one of the most efficient in Africa. 
In the pharmaceutical sector, there are certain tendencies that have implications on 
their positive outcome. The expansion of hospitals, for instance, implies an increase in 
demand for drugs. Also, the deregulation of the national economy and the health 
sector combined with the expansion of private medicine and the increased demand for 
recent and popular drugs, threaten the survival of the pharmaceutical policy that has 
been successful, from the MoH's point of view, for years. 
2 The proportion of funds from the state destined to the health sector has gone up from 9% in 1996 to 











1.4.2 Health system structure and problems3 
The management of the National Health Service (NHS) is structured in three levels: 
Ministry of Health (MoH)- Central Level (CL), Provincial Level (PL) and District 
Level (DL). The MoH-CL has under its supervision various institutions; some of them 
are three central hospitals that have financial autonomy. The MoH allocates resources 
throughout the provinces, supervises and inspects activities, formulates strategies, 
creates norms, defines targets and conducts various operations, ranging from 
fumigation with insecticides to the continuous training of personnel. During the 90s 
the CL has been increasing notably the resources directly managed by them, to the 
point of doubling their staff. There is yet another department called the Provincial 
Department of Health (PDH), which is essentially an administrative body, modelled 
by the MoH responsible for all the activities related to health services in the province. 
The PDH enjoys a considerable amount of management autonomy, being responsible 
for the allocation of resources throughout the province, management of personnel, 
supervision, etc. The PDH hires and exonerates low-level workers. The majority of 
the services provided in the districts, which are managed by the DL reach an average 
of 100,000 people (the extremes are 10,000 and 400,000). Most of the senior staff at 
the DL are not professional managers, but healthcare professionals. 
The medication storage and distribution network follows the NHS structure, I.e. 
central, provincial and district deposits and sanitary unit pharmacies (SUP). 
The sanitary network is structured into four levels: 
3 This section draws largely from the Ministry of Health's pharmaceutical department's evaluation 











Table 1.1: the sanitary network 
Level Category of I Approximate Approximate . Type of service provided 
sanitary unit number of number of available 
sanitary units : beds 
Health care post 700 I Primary care (preventive and 
I • 7.200 curative) 
Health care centre 350 
I 
I Rural hospitals First referral with basic 
II 30 3.200 surgical facilities 
i I General hospitals I 
I Surgery, o bstetri cs, 
III Provincial hospitals 7 1.800 gynaecology, paediatrics, 
. orthopaedics and dentistry 
Central hospitals 3 The most differentiated 
IV sanitary units, with multiple 
Psychiatric hospitals 2 2.900 fields and sub-fields 
(especially in Maputo central 
hospitals which has half of . 
i 
the beds at this level) 
I '----... . . 
Source: MInIStry of Health, PharmaceutIcal department 2001 
The composition of the sanitary network is in evolution, in the sense that small health 
care posts are being upgraded to small health care centres and some big health care 
centres are being upgraded to rural hospitals. All the hospitals in the public sector, as 
well as medium-sized and big health care centres, have pharmacies. The small health 
care centres and health care posts, due to their characteristics, do not have proper 
pharmacies. With a population of around 17.7 million to care for, the sanitary network 
is not enough to ensure the overall access to all the basic healthcare procedures (MoH 
2001). 
As far as human resource is concerned, the healthcare sector employs approximately 
16,500 workers, from which around 60% are healthcare professionals. Top level and 
medium level staff are only 4% and 16% of the workforce, respectively. A few 
hundred technicians in engineering complement the national staff (MoH, 2001). The 
MoH and its provincial department are directly responsible for the education of 











Despite the progress made, serious problems remain. The quality of initial and 
continuous instruction and of supervision is inadequate. Incentives and career 
prospects await radical reforms. Top-level personnel remain concentrated in the big 
cities, particularly in the capital. Human resource management keeps using 
bureaucratic assessments to evaluate performance. Losses due to HIV / AIDS, now in 
the hundreds of workers a year, will increase the propagation of the disease. Reforms 
in the public sector recently initiated by the government should reduce the impact of 
the problems mentioned above. 
The coverage and consumption of services increased since 1993 as is depicted in the 
table below. 
Table 1.2: activities and coverage of some selected services (most frequently used) 
Activities Total Total Growth Consumption 
consumption consumption per person 
1993 2000 (2000) 
External 6.252.937 14.350 129% 0,8 
consultations 
Births in sanitary 193.166 313.400 62% 40% 
units 
Vaccination 293.635 591.187 101% 93% 
Health units 38.954.107 61.954.468 59% 3,6 
.. 
Source: Mmlstry of Health, PharmaceutIcal department 2001 
This increase is due to a number of factors and these are: the refugee resettlement, the 
accessibility to previously inaccessible areas, the opening of new sanitary units, the 
improvement of healthcare services, the increase and redistribution of the resources 
available, the increased efficiency of the operations, and the progressive recovery of 
civil life (MoH, 2001). 
There are still serious imbalances between and within the provinces. Niassa, Cabo 
Delgado, Nampula and Zambezia are the least favoured. The provinces in the Centre 











to the rest of the country. This results in an uneven distribution of resources, with 
Maputo city receiving six times more resources per capita than Zambezia (the least 
favoured). As the volume of activities undertaken is directly correlated with the size 
of the sanitary network, huge investments are being aimed at the North and Zambezia. 
In each province, the national pattern repeats itself; more resources and higher levels 
of consumption are allocated to the capital, leaving the rural areas deprived of any 
service. However, the distance between privileged and deprived populations has been 
decreasing. On average, in 2000 the top quartile of privileged population consumed 
4.7 times more services than the lower quartile of the underprivileged population, 
against a difference of 5.7 in 1997 (MoH, 2001). 
Like in most African countries, the quality and service of healthcare remain low: long 
waits, short duration of appointments, illegal fees charged, and not motivated and 
incompetent personnel, wrong use of medication, lack of medication, torn equipment 
and lack of personnel with adequate education in the periphery. 
1.4.3 The pharmaceutical sector 
Until mid 1998, drugs in Mozambique were regulated by the dispositions contained in 
the enactment 229/70 which approved the regulation of the pharmaceutical 
professional exercise. From the organizational point of view this meant a structured 
pharmaceutical service with responsibilities in the pharmaceutical regulatory areas 
and provision of drugs in the context of a centrally planned economy. The 
responsibility of drug supply has been empowered under the enactment No.13/75 to 
the medical centre of medicines, which was responsible for the purchase and 
distribution of drugs to the public sector (MoH, 2002). 
In 1975 the Ministry of Health established a technical commission of pharmacies, 
which was an organ of a consultive character with the responsibility of contributing to 
the definition and establishment of a national political pharmacy. One of the results 
obtained from the work of this commission was the publication in 1977 of the first 
edition of essential drugs, which contained 430 types of medicines, 20 diagnostic 
agents, and 14 rapid plasters. This changed though in 1977, through article 27/77 
which introduced alterations in the juridical board of medicines that exist. These 











acquiring drugs that were not part of the essential drug list and it made it compulsory 
to use international generic names on medical prescriptions. It also prohibited the 
advertisement of drugs (MoH, 2002). It is important to note that these alterations were 
taken in the context of a nationalised health sector. 
When this happened, owners of some importing companies were not happy and most 
of them opted to abandon their companies. This brought about the creation of a 
limited company known as MEDIMOC in 1987. This company at first worked with 
private importers until 1988, having obtained excellent results in the reduction of 
unitary prices of importation. This resulted in MEDIMOC being attributed exclusivity 
from 1979 (MoH, 2002). 
The combination of a centralised buying and the fact that it was the only importing 
company had a pervasive effect on the drug regulatory system; it actually changed the 
whole health system. The registration of drugs, given the lack of competition since 
there was only one importer, stopped being of importance in serving the quality drugs, 
while the pharmaceutical inspection started being neglected. By reasons linked to the 
evolution and capacity of the MoH, gradually MEDIMOC started assuming certain 
responsibilities, by their own initiative. This resulted in the adoption of the of 
CMMA's old functions with the intention of resolving MEDIMOC's problems (MoH, 
2002). 
1.4.4 Health sector reforms in progress 
The debate about the healthcare sector began in the early 90s, resulting in many 
initiatives, frequently promoted by cooperation agencies. Amongst the various trends 











Box 1: Health sector reforms in progress in Mozambique 
» The expansion of private practice, for profit and non-profit. The profit providers are experiencing a 
constant growth in the urban areas. The big public hospitals provide higher quality and more comfortable 
services, if a higher fee is paid. In the rural areas, there are a limited number of non-profit sanitary units, 
managed by religious organizations, but funded mainly by the government and by charity organizations. 
The NGOs provide complementary healthcare services, frequently supporting the public sector directly. 
The traditional doctors and nurses provide services to the communities. 
» Return of the activities previously undertaken by NGOs in the public sector. The proportion of 
channelled resources through the NGOs has been reducing. The number of active NGOs in this sector 
has been falling due to the end of many projects connected to the war context. The national NGOs have 
been growing rapidly in number, although only a few achieved important sizes. 
» Restructuring of certain specific areas, such as pharmaceutical, administrative, and sub-sectorial reforms. 
» Decentralization of responsibilities, in benefit of more peripheral decision levels. The NHS management 
remains relatively centralized. Around 40% of the State's Budget is controlled by the Central hospitals. 
In certain areas, such as investment, the power of the central levels reaches higher levels. The 
authoritarian and centralist tradition is associated with thc weaknesses of the periphery levels, the . 
detection of which ends up reinforcing the first. While the control of certain tasks, such as the purchase i 
of medication, shows clear advantages. Meanwhile, with the present situation persisting (favoured by the 
presence of non-professional managers in the sector), the Central hospital ends up linking the regulatory 
mandate with the executive one, resulting in role uncertainties and inevitable conflicts. 
» Hiring services, from companies outside the public sector, such as MEDIMOC. 
Source: MoH 2001 
The reform process has not been a constant one; instead, it has been the result of 
many forces. Some areas have been more dynamic and showing a clearer vision of the 
direction to take. Certain options were abandoned. 
1.5 Statement of the problem 
The introduction of the TRIPS agreement has brought about certain concerns and 
debates in the phannaceutical area. There are two main concerns in developing 
countries: one is that they will be unable to afford patented drugs because the latter's 
prices will be too high and two is that the less expensive generic drugs will not be 
available, due to the fact that these will have to await expiration of patented drugs 
before being put in the market. If the public sector does not have the capacity to 
access and distribute generic and affordable drugs, this will further increase 
inequalities in health and health care. Only those who can afford more expensive 
drugs will access these from their alternative sources, leaving the poor with 
inadequate or no health care at all (EQUINET and SADC Health Sector, 2000). 
According to the World Health Organization, some 300 to 500 million people around 
the world suffer from the effects of malaria and around one million succumb to it 
every year, most of them children. Sub-Saharan Africa has been worst hit, with 90 per 
cent of Africa's malaria cases registered there. African countries spend 40 per cent of 











domestic product would have been 100 billion dollars higher if malaria had been 
successfully contained in the past. 
Malaria pandemic in Mozambique is on the increase and the distressing part is that the 
resistance to chloroquine is increasing in high levels and the Mozambican government 
has acknowledged this problem. There is therefore a consensus on the need for new 
drugs but the latter will imply more costs incurred by the government mainly because 
the new drugs are likely to be under patents. Hence, even if new drugs were 
developed against these scourges there is a need to ensure that these are available to 
all the patients in Mozambique, especially those heavily dependent on the public 
sector for provision. 
The dilemma is that Mozambique has no local production of anti-malarial drugs hence 
all the medicine they require for malaria is imported from abroad, making these not 
readily available. TRIPS requires patent protection for all products and processes, 
with a minimum duration of 20 years from the original date of filing. This 
requirement might cause dire consequences for the accessibility of anti-malarial drugs 
since it might delay the availability of generic drugs in the country. The government 
needs therefore to scrutinise the existing options that they could undertake to modify 
their laws and regulations within the agreement so as to ensure that the problem of 
malaria is effectively solved. Whether this is possible or not is debatable. 
1.6 Aims and Objectives of the study 
In order to help policy makers this study will provide findings and conclusions 
required to alert them to the implications of TRIPS in Mozambique through the 
analysis of existing laws and regulations and the experience of neighbouring countries 
with regard to pharmaceuticals. It will further investigate the viability of these 
regulations given the competing interests of key stakeholders in the pharmaceutical 
policy arena. 
The research specifically aims at accomplishing the following objectives: 
(i) To describe the current laws and regulations in the pharmaceutical industry 












(ii) Examine the likely implication of TRIPS for anti-malarial drugs III 
Mozambique. 
(iii) Look at less developed countries' experiences with TRIPS, and how the 
strengthening of patent protection affected their pharmaceutical industries. 
1. 7 Justification of the study 
Malaria is highly endemic in Mozambique, resulting in high mortality rates, most of 
which are children under 5 (18% of deaths). Accounting for 70% of all paediatric 
admissions, malaria is also a major cause of anaemia, low birth weight and 
miscarriages, (Roll Back Malaria profile, 2000). For these reasons malaria is 
considered a public health problem in Mozambique. The emergence and spread of 
anti-malarial first line therapy resistance has limited the achievement of an effective 
control of malaria in this country. 
Recent studies estimated the level of resistance of P. falciparum to chloroquine (first 
line and cheapest drug) to be around 30-40 percent in sentinel sites situated in the 
most populated urban areas (Roll Back Malaria Report 2000). This is seriously 
increasing mortality rates in the country. There is a need to switch to other drugs. The 
problem though is that these drugs will be considerably more expensive than the 
current first line treatment, given that they are usually newer drugs and still under 
patent. 
Results from this study will be of particular importance to the Mozambican Ministry 
of Health, who are currently struggling with this major health problem in the country. 
Political commitment in the health sector is very strong shown by the level of 
participation and activities done to combat malaria. The country's National Malaria 
Control Programme conducts an annual indoor spraying programme in almost all low 
lying land concentrations of poor quality housing but despite the effort this only 
covers about 10% of the population. This points back to the fact that what is 
considered to be of utmost importance are efficient drugs. Government being the main 
provider would be interested in analysing the impact of TRIPS on drugs and find 
ways to adjust their regulations so as to accommodate the provisions of this 











This research will provide information to the relevant stakeholders about where 
Mozambique stands when it comes to TRIPS hence allowing them to critically assess 
which way is best for being able to get the new drugs recommended for malaria to be 
accessible to all sectors of the population. Through the analysis of current policies and 
the past experiences with TRIPS this paper will allow the ministry of health an 
awareness of the possible consequences to the oncoming potential impact of this 
agreement. 
1.8 Scope and Limitations of the study 
Like any other study, there are limitations to the collection of data. Because of time 
and access to data, the study is limited to the public sector only, also because it would 
take a much broader study to look at both the private and public sector in the whole 
country; mainly because the private sector is dispersed around the whole country, 
which is out of reach to such a small study. It is important to note though that the fact 
that the private sector is not included is unlikely to have such an implication on both 
the results and the recommendations of the study as the same laws apply to both 
sectors, that is, in relation to intellectual property and/or patents. 
But it is still acknowledged that the private sector, unlike its counterpart, imports 
more patented drugs than generics but the implication of TRIPS in the country as a 
whole will still be felt in both the private and the public sector because the new laws 
to be implemented apply to the whole country. The study site is the capital of 
Mozambique, which is where all the data related to the public sector, is located. 
Given the size of Mozambique and varIOUS provInces, each with their cultural 
differences, the study may not have an accurate representation of the country 
especially when it comes to what other importing companies prefer when it comes to 
importing anti-malarial drugs to sell in private pharmacies. Also, Mozambique has a 
critical shortage of important data and this is a serious limitation that makes it very 
difficult to produce a comprehensive picture of the situation in Mozambique and what 
is likely to happen when TRIPS is implemented. It is therefore important to note that 














"If nature has made one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of 
the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to 
himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the receiver 
cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because 
every other possesses the whole of it. He, who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That 
an idea should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of 
man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by 
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any 
point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of 
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, be subject of property." 
-Thomas Jefferson (1980) 
This thesis is largely concerned with how the ownership of a product impacts those 
that do not own that product or those that did not take part in the production of that 
product and these products are called property rights. Property rights are the rights 
individuals appropriate over their own labour in the goods and services they possess 
(North, 1994). Economic rules define property rights, as the bundle of rights over the 
use and the income to be derived from property and the ability to alienate an asset or a 
resource. The chapter will analyze why we have patent protection and how the 
enforcement of such a protection is likely to impact on developing countries. 
2.1 The foundations of patent protection 
Back in the yesteryears, certain segments of European commerce became centralized 
and exclusively controlled by various groups. These monopolies were nothing like the 
modern exclusive rights awarded for inventive developments. The right to control 
various sectors of the market became a royal priVilege, granted by the monarch in 
return for various benefits. These early patent monopolies were not concerned with 
invention but rather with commerce. The monarch would grant the privilege to 
practice a certain art or manufacturing process to a foreigner who brought new 











train a number of citizens. The tenn of the patent was almost always for a certain term 
of years. By the time of Elizabeth, this practice had become a burden on free 
competition; this effect was heightened by the gradual transition from a feudal to a 
mercantile economy (Miller, 1983). 
Thus, in 1623, the Statute of Monopolies effectively ended the monopolies affecting 
free trade and competition. The common law reaction against monopolies was 
received in the New World and gradually the American colonies became more 
fiercely opposed to monopolies than their English counterparts. The colonists started 
recognizing that the offer of an exclusive patent to someone who invented something 
new and useful would encourage inventiveness. By the time of the Revolution, almost 
all of the colonies had granted patents. At the Constitutional Convention, in 1787, a 
measure was proposed to incorporate the ability to secure, for limited times, patents 
and copyrights. The first patent law was enacted in 1790 and thereafter only three 
major revisions were made, in 1793, 1836, and 1952. The present Patent Act, enacted 
in 1952, is completely codified in Title 35 of the United States Code (Miller, ibid.). 
2.2 Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights (lPR) are rights given to an individual's creativity. This 
right was established in order to acknowledge the creation of human mind by 
promoting the publication of ideas and inventions so as to make them available to 
others who will improve them in the future. Another rationale for the proliferation of 
these rights is to provide an economic incentive for people to be creative and invent 
things by making sure that the creator of an idea can benefit financially from hislher 
invention. The idea of intellectual property rights is to reward the inventor of ideas by 
granting him/her a temporary monopoly power in exchange for making hislher idea 
available to society. There are different types of IPs but this paper is interested in the 
most well known one, which are patents (for different inventions with industrial 
application). 
A patent is a grant of monopoly power by the state to an inventor who is therein given 
the exclusive right to commercially exploit her or his invention for a limited period of 
time. The patent provides an incentive to invent and innovate. To obtain a patent one 











approved by the patent office; their validity only takes place when issued and only in 
the country where they have been issued. For validity in other countries there is a 
need to file an international application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. An 
invention can only be patentable under these criteria: originality (novelty), 
inventiveness and industrial applicability or utility. 
In exchange for a temporary monopoly on its use, a patent necessitates the creator to 
disclose his invention. It is through this short-term monopoly power that the inventor 
will earn hislher profit in case of trade ofthe invention or in case a third party is given 
a license to use the invention. According to Heinemann (1999) without intellectual 
property protection, technical innovation would be a public good; no one could be 
excluded from it; common use by an unrestricted number of people would be possible' 
(Zach, 1999). The incident of free rider would retrench the incentives to invest in 
innovation activities. Intellectual property converts public goods into private ones 
hence excluding third parties from accessing it and increasing incentives for 
innovation activities. This is a way of encouraging innovation and rewarding 
someone's creativity. The profits gained from this patent are not automatic, just like 
any other goods and services that can have a lack of profit if the demand for them is 
low. 
The owner of a patented product uses his position to control a market to the 
disadvantage of competitors and consumers. He can prevent potential competitors 
from developing products similar to his own, and he can charge higher prices for the 
product. Such a monopoly can undoubtedly lead to unfair advantage from intellectual 
property right holders and this can only have one consequence, abuse. In Loughlan's 
words, the ordinary, rational, profit-maximizing, private firm will only invest in 
research and development when that form of investment can be calculated to yield an 
economic return, on a risk adjusted basis, at least as attractive as that which 
alternative forms of investment can offer (Loughlan, 1998). The patent system, with 
its promise of monopoly and its inhibition of free riders, helps to make investment in 
R&D economically attractive. In other words, patent law exists to prevent the market 











The basic reason for intellectual property is that a man should own what he produces, 
that is, what he brings into being. According to Bainbridge (1999) encouragement, 
inducement and reward are the main factors underlying the patent system. The public 
interest, although jeopardized by the grant of a monopoly, is said to be secured by 
increased industrial activity, developing new technologies and disclosure of new and 
useful inventions. Under the TRIPS agreement the public is claimed to be protected 
through their safeguard, i.e. compulsory licensing, to control any significant abuse of 
the patent monopoly, but whether or not that helps for developing countries is still 
questionable. But again if patent protection were to be abolished tomorrow, inventive 
activity would not cease altogether but that will never be the case because the contrary 
has happened, they have been strengthened. The next section justifies IPRs implicitly. 
2.3 Justifying Intellectual Property Rights 
It is generally assumed that technological advance depends on the development of 
science. Causation is sometimes believed to lead from the growth of knowledge in 
science over technological growth to economic growth. The main justification for 
IPRs is the fact that human beings should be rewarded for the fruits of their labour as 
a right they naturally own. But there is an argument against this justification in 
Thumm (2000) that suggests that intellectual products are not in themselves original, 
in the sense that they build on other existing intellectual work. John Locke argues that 
there should be gratitude for ownership of additional input added but not total 
ownership. Another argument by Thumm against intellectual property rights is that 
intellectual property should not provide ownership at the full market value via IPRs. 
This value is said to depend on too many different factors (product marketing, patent 
conditions, market constitution and others), which are not related to the direct creation 
of the intellectual product. 
Another justification for IPRs is drawn from the need of a scientific and technological 
progress. Without IPR individuals, organisations etc would not have any incentive at 
all to invest in research and development. This is because there would be free riders 
that would be willing to copy intellectual property in the absence of the inventor. 
Patent pirates in some developing countries freely copy (pirate) innovative medicines 
that are under patent in the United States and other countries without compensating 











lose $1 to pIracy for every $3 worth of products shipped overseas. U.S. 
pharmaceutical firms are projected to invest over $26 billion in R&D in 2000 alone, 
but the U.S. International Trade Commission found that global patent piracy reduces 
annual R&D investment by $720-$900 million annually (PhRMA, 1998). 
Technological knowledge does not go without market failures. One of these is the 
large amount of costs incurred by the investor and the indivisibility of research 
expenditures. The other market failure is the investment risk that one faces due to 
technological uncertainty and investment for research and development. The other 
rationale for market failure is the problem of non-excludability i.e. inventors of 
knowledge cannot prevent others from using it. There is no rivalry in this product. 
Economically, there are no marginal costs of providing intellectual objects to an 
additional user. Under free market conditions these features result in an excessive use 
of intellectual property and hence a loss of incentive for research and development 
investments. This is where government is required to play her role in the form of 
intellectual property rights. This is what brings a dual debate about the impact of IPRs 
on the free flow of ideas. Whereas on the one hand they limit the availability and use 
of intellectual products, they, on the other hand, limit the future production and 
availability of these products. 
Without IPRs innovators will be reluctant to invest and spend money on researching 
how to develop new products and by making others pay for the usage of intellectual 
products could also mean no business for inventors. There has to be a way of 
rewarding inventors without jeopardizing the public interest. In Gervais's words "the 
question of optimal intellectual property right protection is one of finding the correct 
equilibrium between the innovation spurring and knowledge deterring effects in the 
performance of IPR" (Gervais, 1998). 
There are many arguments against IPRs and this comes from the fact that innovators 
can abuse the monopoly power granted to them in the form of patents and this they 
can do in many ways, such as dominating the market and creating barriers to entry 
against competitors. But we should also take the point of view of the innovator 
whereby firms and or individuals imitating the inventor become more efficient in 











market appropriate product version. By so doing, the second mover will have saved 
hugely on research and development costs. 
The following section takes it from the point of view of macroeconomics and 
microeconomics. These sections draw largely from Thumms work on justifying 
intellectual property rights from the economic point of view. 
2.4 Microeconomic theory of IPRs 
Many economic theories, such as neo-classics, new growth theory and evolutionary 
theory consider innovation as one, if not the main source, of economic growth. The 
reasoning behind IPRs is driven from the fact that the public good character of 
technological knowledge requires artificial incentives for innovators in the form of 
temporary monopoly rights on innovations (Thumm, 2000). According to economic 
theory IPRs increase expected profits for the innovator and gives him/her the 
incentive4 to invest more in research and development in order to increase the effect 
of innovation. The classical welfare analysis of IPRs refers to monopoly theory and 
considers the general welfare effect negative because there is a dead weight loss, 
which is caused by the way monopolists, price their products. The intellectual 
property right holder sells less quantity of the innovative good for a higher price, 
implementing a dead weight loss compared to the competitive market situation. 
According to Tirole (1988), innovation reduces the marginal cost curve of production 
in graph 2.1 from Cl to C2 within an already existing market. In a competitive market 
situation quantities Ql and Q2 would be produced. When invention is protected one 
would expect prices to increase because the inventor is now setting monopolistic 
prices at a higher level, where the production costs are equal to its marginal revenue. 
If we look at figure 1 this scenario is reflected by prices Pml which is at its highest 
level (pml>Cl) where the production costs Cl are equal to MR. 
The additional surpluses (area I and II) are the monopoly's profit and stand for the 
monopolist's incentive to innovate. Nonetheless, monopolistic profits are only 
4 Human beings are believed to need some form of motivation and/or incentive to do things, for 
instance they go to work because at the end of the month they will get a financial or self satisfaction 











possible by reducing the production level in comparison to the competitive situation 
(Qml <Ql). According to Schumpeter, monopoly power is conducive to innovation, 
and thus welfare losses are the price we have to pay for innovative activity. But it is 
important to note that an already established monopolist has a lower additional profit 
from innovating than its competitor who is a newcomer on the market. Competitors 
still gain the entire new monopoly profit from innovation, whereas the monopolist 
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Graph 2.1: welfare effects of monopolist pricing of a single invention 
The main question is what would happen without intellectual property rights. Some 











their achievement of the innovators' technological knowledge the scenario would be 
different. Graph 2.2 shows us how different. Competitors, as one would expect, would 
freely enter the marke~ and come up with an own production, which would take away 
some demand from the original innovator. New competitors do not bear the costs of 
research and achieve supra-normal profits. This will attract further potential imitators 
to enter the market. Any additional supplier lowers down the original demand curve 
of the innovator from Dl to Dn. Consequently, the innovator's profit decreases, 
shown by the decreasing shadowed areas, and finally total profit's quantity is lower 
than the research and development costs. If we take this reasoning into consideration 
the rational innovator would decide not to invest in R&D and the total benefit from 
innovation is lost for society. The incentive to innovate is driven by the surplus gained 
from innovation. Without barriers to entry entrepreneurs theoretically enter the market 
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Conclusively, Intellectual Property Rights create an artificial market barrier for 
competitors and therefore ensures that profits are not driven down to zero. 
Competition is essential to ensure that the innovation process continues. It encourages 
economic growth by disallowing that innovators establish in the long term as 
monopolists and it is an assurance that innovation will always be overcome by 
relatively newer innovation. Monopolistic industries are better equipped for 
innovation than competitive ones in so far as they can prevent imitation better and 
therefore capture more profit for innovation. A monopolist is also more able to 
finance high research and development costs, (Thumm, ibid). 
It is for this reason that it is doubted that monopolies are really a natural ground for R 
&D and that there actually exists causation from a strong market position towards 
innovation. The main problem of the monopolist is that he/she basically has the lower 
incentive to innovate in terms of expected surplus from innovation, (Zeuthen, ibid). 
But, this does not take away the argument that the innovator needs a strong market 
position in order to cover his R&D expenditures. Therefore the granting of intellectual 
property rights is a prerequisite for the creation of an innovative society. On the other 
hand we see that granting monopolistic rights in form of intellectual property rights is 
not a first best solution because they do not achieve the socially best amount of 
invention and thus fail as a political instrument in promoting the most favourable 
amount of invention. 
2.5 Macroeconomic Theory of Intellectual Property Rights 
There has been a worldwide debate about the pros and cons of IPRs and this has been 
emphasised after the proliferation of international agreements related to Intellectual 
Property Rights. There is a conflict of interests between industrialised first world and 
developing third world countries. As Loughlan (1998) puts it "the complexity of 
international intellectual property rights, should be considered within a dynamic 
model that includes trade effects, the role of foreign direct investment, the allocation 
of research and development and catching up possibilities". 
One of the easiest ways of analysing this type of situation would be to look at it from 
the point of view of a two country situation, i.e. a rich and innovative country against 











innovators, who export their technology, will lose their market shares in the imitating 
countries. This would lead to a fall in monopolistic prices for the innovators, hence 
losing their producer surplus leading to a lack of incentive to invest. 
On the other hand consumers will be enjoying low product prices from both types of 
countries and hence get a free ride on the technologically advanced country. But the 
critical issue that should not be overlooked is the fact that these imitators need the 
innovators for the production of their goods, hence if we demolish the latter's 
incentive to invent the free-ride might only be temporal because there will be no 
product to imitate from, since inventors will have lost the incentive to research. This 
factor shows us the importance of time in the sense that in the short run free riders 
have something to gain but in the long run they run out of gains and this might impact 
their whole system of existence. In this context it is important to note that short run 
investments through imitation jeopardise long-term investments in R&D. 
In cases whereby there is an extended patent protection, i.e. whereby protection of the 
technologically advanced country's innovation is also guaranteed in the poor non-
innovative country, the monopolists (innovators) achieve monopoly profits from both 
countries. In this situation the monopolists face lower research costs and therefore 
have a higher incentive to invest in innovation. Consumers from both countries will 
therein benefit from this additional innovation. They do not go without paying for that 
though, since they have to pay higher monopolistic prices. 
What we have to realise here is that the welfare gains for the innovative country 
comes not only from its consumers but also from consumers of the poor country. The 
net welfare effect therefore depends on the additional consumer loss in the country 
that does not have the capacity to innovate because of higher prices in relation to the 
benefits from new innovation in both countries. The relative market sizes in both 
countries playa major role in determining the net effect of the gains and losses. If this 
were the case it would be ideal to find out what would happen if African countries 
joined forces to fight against international agreements and industrialised countries. 
But the question is how large is the market size of African countries to determine the 
net effect of the gains and losses of such agreements. It is unlikely that it could be 











of technology and innovation. With regards to international agreements on intellectual 
property rights and its incorporation of developing countries it is debatable whether or 
not patent protection is not redistributing welfare away from developing countries. 
The first economists to analyse the problem of intellectual property rights in a poor-
rich country framework, were Chin and Grossman (1988). These came about with a 
conclusion that poor, non-creative (innovative) countries are most likely to achieve 
higher national welfare when they neglect to protect patents. But this only applies to 
situations where innovation is not productive such that poorer countries would not 
gain from innovation. But it is unlikely that a particular country would not gain from 
innovation especially in the case of pharmaceuticals whereby old and new diseases 
depend on innovation to be eradicated. 
Grossman argues that the world as a whole gains when poor countries do not enforce 
IPR protection i.e. when innovation is booming. It is for the fact that rich innovative 
countries always benefit from having their IPR protected that the main focus should 
be on how to make efficient bargaining between both countries, without making the 
poor countries worse off. According to Diwan and Rodrick (1991) poor countries can 
only benefit from free riding if there is no detrimental effect of imitating innovative 
activities. It is also crucial to note though that poor and rich countries have different 
technological needs and demands and that both countries need something from each 
other. 
Rich countries know that in order to achieve maximum profits the poor countries must 
have an interest in their products so that they are able to spread their fixed costs over a 
large range by selling their products in poor countries' markets. So, rich countries do 
have a motivation to market their products to poor countries hence, the stronger the 
protection in the innovative countries, the higher the expansion of a wide variety of 
discovered technology. As a result, poor countries' protection (given the fact that they 
have an interest in getting their own technological needs from the rich) encourages 
innovation of their technological needs from the rich innovative countries. 
Thumms argues that any model explaining the analysis of intellectual property rights 











welfare analysis, he argues, describes a dynamic equilibrium between the rise in 
global consumer surplus and the rise of producer surplus imitators, the fall of 
producer surplus in innovating countries and the changes in the rate of innovation. 
The dynamic welfare analysis of intellectual property rights is best explained by 
Krugman's (1979) model of endogenous growth that deals with innovation and 
imitation within North and South framework. It is first assumed that the rate of 
innovation is taken as an endogenous variable, old goods are common property and 
can be produced in both North and South, whereas new goods are only produced in 
the North. The level at which new goods will be produced depends on the already 
available stock of technology. This model does not consider any possibility of the 
South catching up with technological advances from the North. 
n being the total number of products available in North and South (n=nN+nS) and 
1/t being time before South learns how to manufacture a new product. 
The growth rate of N orthem products nN depends on the total number of products n, 
the innovation rate r and the proportion tnN that is copied by the South. 
These equations determine the availability of products in both regions and they show 
us that both regions depend on the rate of innovation r. From these equations we can 
tell that a high rate of innovation is in the interest of both North and South. There is a 
need therefore to ensure that innovators maintain the incentive to innovate and 
whether or not intellectual property right is the way to go is debatable. 
Romer (1990) who highly believes in human capital argues that what is necessary for 
growth is not the protection of intellectual property but the amount of human capital 
for innovation. He says, "New designs automatically provide a monopolistic position 
in the market and thus inherently contain the incentive to innovate". Some see 
imitation as a natural means of giving out/distributing knowledge and as a source of 











latter it is cheaper to imitate but only if the number of copiable products keeps 
increasing or remains the same because trying to identify uncopied products can be as 
expensive as research costs. 
Barro and Sala-iMartin believe that the rate of copying decreases over time and 
growth rates in both countries converge in the long run towards a steady state. But this 
would mean the South does catch up technologically and there is a convergence 
towards a steady state after a long time of copying from the North, but the question 
would be how realistic this is. The main feature in this model is the composition of 
the cost imitation V2: 
The cost of imitation depends on the number of goods that have been discovered but 
there can only be so many goods left uncopied. Barro et aI, conclude that imitation 
leaves no room to motivate innovation and they agree that intellectual property rights 
might be the best way to compensate this lack of incentive. Some authors argue that 
no inter-country technology diffusion takes place without patent protection and if 
there is denial of such protection innovators will opt for secrecy and the latter will not 
help in the distribution of knowledge. In Grossman and Helpman's words 
international intellectual property right is the guarantee of full knowledge diffusion 
and free trade in ideas. Currie, Levine et al. (1996) support this argument. They 
emphasise that the knowledge transfer between countries increases given intellectual 
property rights and this supposedly accelerates the development of less innovative 
countries. 
Thumm (2000) questions this development in the South, given the fact that there is a 
lack of knowledge capital stock. Helpman (1993) discovered that intellectual property 
rights shift production and terms of trade from the South towards the North, making 
the latter the sole winner from strengthening intel1ectual property rights. His paper 
shows that the overall welfare effect of international intellectual property rights 
largely depends on the level of imitation, trade relations with regards to the affected 
products and the presence of foreign direct investment. His conclusion was that the 











Conclusively, less innovative countries depend on foreign direct investment and 
foreign technology from innovative countries. Hence if they do not want to be left out 
by international technological and economic developments and if they want to hold 
out against competing countries in the race for foreign direct investment they have to 
make their markets attractive, which among other things means a standardised 
intellectual property right protection. It is difficult to distinguish between the macro 
and microeconomic levels when analysing international intellectual property rights. 
There are obvious differences between innovating and imitating countries and these 
include needs, preferences and interests. It is because of these differences that the 
debate about intellectual property rights is endless and leads to the search for different 
options by the South as they seek ways to have access to the North's products at a 
cheaper rate than the actual hence the increase in price discrimination and parallel 
importation. This leads us to the next section, which goes into more detail about the 
latter subjects. 
2.6 Parallel imports and international price discrimination 
Parallel imports are genuine products, and not counterfeits, imported by unauthorized 
resellers. A common situation is where one firm owns the national trademarks in 
several countries, each trademark conferring the exclusive distribution right in that 
country, but another party obtains the product in one country and diverts it to another 
country without the authorization of the trademark holder, (Malueg et al" 1994). 
Policies that support parallel imports do so because they believe that the latter is 
driven by international price discrimination. 
The price discrimination view supports parallel importation because the scope of price 
discrimination is larger internationally (disparities in demand elasticities across 
countries are likely to be greater than across regions within countries, mainly because 
of the larger differences in per capita incomes between countries than regionally 
within countries). Mackie-Mason (1988) says uniform price monopolists would only 
serve the high demand market (seeing as we are facing markets with different known 
demands) but under discrimination would add the second market and not raise price in 
the first. Legal parallel imports flowing in one direction does not prove 
discrimination, it merely reflects differences in demand attributable to different levels 











An advantage of allowing some international price discrimination is that additional 
countries will likely be served. If parallel imports are prevented, at least between 
certain groups of countries, firms could offer lower prices to lower demand countries 
without fearing that the products would resurface in high price markets. Uniform 
pricing will certainly have a negative impact ill developing countries, which are likely 
to go unserved. Malueg found, in his study, that when demand is largely scattered, 
welfare is higher under discrimination. Discrimination, however, affects not only total 
welfare but also distribution between countries. But manufactures of products prone 
to parallel imports are from richer, more technologically advanced countries. 
Allowing complete international price discrimination, in favor of least developed 
countries, will not reduce the national welfare of industrialized countries, especially in 
the case of pharmaceuticals. According to Schut (1986) pharmaceutical's prices vary 
internationally because of the different per capita incomes. Poor countries often pay 
higher prices than rich ones and these reversals are claimed to be caused by varying 
government policies in LDCs and also from choices by suppliers to target their 
products to the rich rather than the mass market in LDCs. Suppliers are said to do this 
because LDCs do not allow them to control parallel imports. So price discrimination 
does not necessarily favor LDCs. 
2.7 International pharmaceutical market 
Patents are of vast importance in the pharmaceutical sector. Actually, the existence of 
the TRIPs Agreement is due to the pressure from the big pharmaceutical companies 
on the United States government, which in turn insisted that this issue should be on 
the agenda of the Uruguay Round negotiations. Pharmaceutical products rely on 
patent protection, which gives drug makers a temporal monopoly power over the 
marketing of a new chemical unit. This is because for pharmaceutical products it takes 
a long time to develop a new chemical unit, but when a drug is eventually developed 
and displayed in the market it becomes easier for a generic manufacturer to produce a 
copy. If we had generic manufacturers waiting to make copies of new drugs there 
would certainly be no incentive for innovators to invest in new drugs. 
Patent protection therefore gives drug developers that incentive to invest in new drugs 











consequently opening the door for generic manufacturers to enter the market. This 
incentive required by the drug developers also comes into cause because of the costs 
they incur developing a new chemical unit. There is a high fixed cost of research and 
development of drugs hence in the context of a competitive market with marginal cost 
pricing, the drug developer would make a loss because average costs are always 
above marginal costs given that marginal costs of producing each unit is close to zero. 
Drug developers try therefore to spread fixed costs over more and more units so as to 
reduce average costs such that a firm would not invest in the development of a new 
drug unless they can price it above marginal cost. As the economist put it "developing 
drugs is expensive. If companies are to keep trying, they must expect to make enough 
profit to meet the cost of developing not only the drugs that work, but also the ones 
that do not" (The Economist, 2001). 
International pharmaceutical markets are well known for the exerCIse of price 
discrimination, which has a costly implication on developing countries. The high 
prices charged by pharmaceuticals do not necessarily reflect the production costs 
incurred by manufacturers of pharmaceutical products. According to Schut et aI, 
(1986: 1141) the common features of the pharmaceutical market are, abnormal 
profits, absence of significant price competition, high concentration in production, 
exceptional expenditure on promotion as well as price discrepancies for identical 
products. 
It is because of these features that pharmaceutical markets are said to exerCise 
extreme market power and charging whatever price the market will bear. This is a 
problem for developing countries like Mozambique because developing countries, as 
a group spend about 1 % of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on pharmaceuticals, 
hence a monopolistic mark up has high opportunity costs implications caused by a 
loss of foreign exchange and investment opportunities forgone. Although there have 
been quests for the reduction of such unbearable costs for developing countries, these 
have been to no avail mostly because studies that have been done to support these 











2.8 Patents and pharmaceuticals 
Pharmaceuticals raise crucial debates about the legitimacy of patents and the patent 
system. Loughlan (ibid) quotes the example Ceredase, a pharmaceutical introduced in 
the market in 1991 in the U.S as the only effective drug therapy for Gaucher's 
disease.5 The price of Ceredase was such as to make one year of treatment costing 
over $100 000. It is the patent on Ceredase, which brought about that price, not the 
cost of its production, even when a rational economic return to the producer was built 
into the concept of cost of production. Because of the legally enforced monopoly the 
owners of the patent on Ceredase charged what they liked. This touching example 
should make us aware of the fact that we are not dealing with any commodity here but 
life saving drugs. Yes, it is agreeable that without the patent protection the drugs 
would probably never exist, hence bringing up questions like, "without the promise of 
a patent why develop the drug at all, why incur non-recoupable costs, why take such 
risks of having new competitors in the market (free riders) who could simply 
manufacture and market the drug at a lower price". 
All these questions make sense but the patent monopoly on the drug also allows a 
price and product output structure which results in many people, who could live 
longer lives with the help of the drug if it were priced reasonably, as would be the 
case of a competitive market, living in some pain or dying young. Developing 
countries argue that the level of intellectual protection demanded of a country should 
correspond with its level of economic development. In Australia for instance, more 
than 90% of the patents approved are granted to foreign patent holders (Loughlan, 
ibid). This figure tells us that the greater part of patents are used to protect foreign 
suppliers from imitations either from domestic or overseas sources hence giving 
foreign patentees leeway to charge monopoly prices in Australia without fearing 
competition by imitators. Without the patent system Australians would be able to 
reverse engineer inventions and supply them cheaper in their country. 
India for instance abolished patents for pharmaceuticals in 1970 and have been able, 
through reverse engineering of pharmaceuticals invented somewhere else, to create a 
successful industry manufacturing compounds chemically equivalent to patented 
5 Gaucher's disease is a condition which leads to an underproduction in the body of a particular enzyme 











pharmaceuticals in other countries and their drug prices have been among the 
cheapest in the world. Actually, prices for a drug sold in India for the same drug sold 
in the U.S vary from 900 to 3010 percent times lower in India and this has an 
immeasurable contribution to public health. Such an abolishment of patents has its 
consequences for signatory countries of the TRIPS agreement such as a general trade 
sanction being taken against the particular country and this could even lead to an 
exclusion from the World Trade Organization and being excluded from the WTO 
means not being recognized in other countries. 
Patents theorists argue that patents impose a major social loss by the way they induce 
increased monopoly prices but that loss in endured because patents create an incentive 
for invention and technological advance. But if society grants patents for inventions 
for which it would have had anyway (because other sorts of incentives to invent have 
been at work), then society endures the deadweight loss with no corresponding benefit 
and there therein a net social loss. The patents regime should therefore be designed in 
such a way that as to minimize social loss in all possible ways. 
Given the fact that developing countries demand different products as compared to 
developed countries there should be a way that the TRIPS agreement caters for these 
differences in a way that ensures a win-win situation. For instance, whereas developed 
countries demand not only drugs but also health care equipment, such as scans, 
developing countries are unlikely to demand equipment over drugs. This is because 
the marginal benefit of having equipment in developing countries is lower than that of 
a drug because the latter solves the problem instead of identifying it. This is not to say 
health care equipment is not demanded in developing countries but when making a 
comparison with their counterpart the demand is incomparably higher. Hence once 
again, as has been mentioned, the TRIPS Agreement should take these differences 
into consideration before suggesting that the same patent protection applied in an 












METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
3.0 Introduction 
This study is mainly based on secondary data and relies on [mdings from past studies 
in the area of intellectual property, given the objectives of the study and the 
availability of data this was found to be most appropriate. The methodology used in 
this study depends on the availability of information with regards to research done in 
this area and the latter is quite limited hence the reason why this paper opted to bring 
together past experiences on the area which would help come with a conclusion to 
what is likely to happen in Mozambique (a country that has no experience with 
regards to patents on pharmaceuticals). Relevant research has therefore been 
analyzed. 
In Mozambique interviews were conducted so as to have an analysis of the history of 
pharmaceutical laws and regulations, as well as what has happened with regards to 
patents in the country. With this information we were able to identify the country's 
weaknesses and hence come with some conclusions as to what will happen to this 
vulnerable country once patents have been strengthened. What should be noted 
though is that this study only covers the public sector hence there is no complete 
coverage of data information but even so it is still possible to come to some 
generalized conclusions in the country. 
This chapter describes the process of data collection that was used for this study. 
The chapter will describe the instruments used for the data collection, sources and 
types of data collected. It will also look at the conceptual framework used for the 
study, both theoretical and diagrammatical. 
3.1 Framework of analysis 
Mozambique, like many other African countries suffers from the lack of updated and 
meaningful data. The objective of this study is to review the potential impact of Trade 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) on the pharmaceutical industry in 











The methodology used to prepare this case study consisted of a situation analysis 
based on a literature review of relevant research and information analysis. Although 
there has been no extensive review of the practical implications of the TRlPS 
agreement on the pharmaceutical industry, there have been many studies on smaller 
parts of the larger issue. Some of these studies specific to less developed countries 
were used for this assessment, including key studies on experiences in drug prices. 
The objective of it all is to find out what these countries have experienced, in relation 
to pharmaceuticals, after the introduction of intellectual property rights. With this 
information it becomes possible to analyze what is likely to happen in Mozambique 
with the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. 
3.2 Conceptual framework 
There is a large debate about the WTO/TRlPS agreement, especially in relation to 
pharmaceuticals. Some authors argue that the strengthening of patent protection will 
have negative effects in less developed countries, especially with regards to 
pharmaceutical prices. The latter is predicted to increase as intellectual property is 
enforced. Others argue that intellectual property will promote and transfer technology, 
FDI, research and development. Countries without protection for these rights will not 
benefit from more advanced nations that are likely to transfer what less advantaged 
nations have, it is argued. 
The relevance of these arguments in this study is the fact that being a WTO member, 
Mozambique and other developing countries have to adhere to 18 specific provisions 
annexed to the Agreement establishing the WTO. They cannot chose to take part in 
some of the agreements (probably those that favor them) and not take part in others. 
The most significant of these provisions to the health sector is the agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
Depending on the way in which national legislation is designed and implemented, 
TRlPS may significantly delay the introduction of new generic drugs and the interest 
Mozambique has on the latter is vast. The study is looking at what is likely to happen, 
due to the introduction of TRlPS, to the prices of antimalarial drugs in Mozambique. 
The fact that there have been a few studies done in this area, mainly because the 











to review other studies and country experiences and use them for the overall analysis 
of this study. 
Subramaniam (1995) found, in his multi-country study (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the 
Phillipines and Thailand), that welfare and price effects of the WTO agreement were 
negative. Price increases estimated for patented drugs ranged from 5-67%. But again a 
single country study in Thailand, done by Supakankuti et al. more recently in 2001, 
reveals no price change due to the patent protection Act that was amended to 
accommodate the TRIPS agreement. But the authors of the latter study still argue that 
some economic disadvantages are expected for the Thai pharmaceutical industry and 
that so far the TRIPS agreement has not provided any evidence of technology transfer 
and foreign direct investment as was stipulated in one of the main objectives of 
TRIPS. This can be shown diagrammatically. 
3.3 Diagrammatic framework 
Trade Related Intellectual 
Protection for new drugs 
Property Rights (TRIPS) 
Adjustment of regulatory 
TRIPS provisions 
framework to accommOdaY 
Low utilization More Less 
due to affordability r--- -More expensive branded genenc 
and availability -Less accessible products drugs 
r 
Rich countries increase Poor countries that need 
profits and monopoly power new drugs disadvantaged 











3.4 Sources of data 
The main actors studied were the Ministry of Health, especially their import/export 
company (MEDIMOC) that deals with the supply of medicines in the country6. The 
other important stakeholder is the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, which 
provided information about the TRIPS Agreement; that is, information about what the 
country has done so far in response to TRIPS requirements so as to ensure that the 
national legislation complies with the provisions stipulated in the agreement and also 
some stakeholder's opinions about the future of TRIPS in Mozambique. 
The National Institute of Industry, which represents the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry, provided all the data needed in relation to intellectual property rights and 
patents in the country. The data needed in relation to intellectual property was with 
regards to patent protection in the country, what laws exist and what laws existed in 
relation to intellectual property, as well as the progress of amending those laws to 
accommodate international agreements. This information is needed in order to tackle 
the first objective. 
The National Institute of Books and Discs, which falls under the Ministry of Culture 
provided some information on patents as well. Stakeholder's opinions through 
interviews, both from the Ministry of Health, Culture and Commerce helped the 
researcher answer and understand some of the critical issues around this topic. 
Literature reVIew resources include the Health economICS resource center, the 
University of Cape Town, electronic databases, including journals. The Mozambican 
Ministry of Health documents, such as health policy documents, National health 
reports and bulletins were also used. For the cross-country comparison, recent articles 
on country experiences with intellectual property rights and pharmaceuticals were 
vastly used. 
On the basis of the work done and previous studies it was possible to arrive at a 
general overview. This will allow conclusions to be drawn and suggestions for 
dealing with the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the country's pharmaceutical 











industry. Given the mentioned objectives in chapter one, the following table 
summarizes the order in which data was collected. 
Table 3.1: summary of data collection 
Research Variables Indicators Location of data 
question collection 
I.Review current Current laws and regulations Drug registration policy, Ministry of 
laws and in the pharmaceutical legislative and regulatory Health. 
regulations in the industry procedures. Department of the 
pharmaceutical pharmaceutical 
industry industry 
2. What are the Provisions of TRIPS National Ministry of 
changes made for agreement incorporated into changes/alterations Commerce and 
the adjustment of national legislation accommodating TRlPSs Industry. 
Intellectual agreement National Institute 
property rights of Industry 
I legislation 
3. What is the Prices of anti-malarial drugs, Prices of anti-malarial drugs, Ministry of 
likely implication total government Costs of antimalarial drugs, Health. 
of TRIPS for anti- expenditure on anti-malarial Finance of pharmaceuticals. Department of 
malarial drug I drugs. pharmaceutical 
prices in industry. 
Mozambique Medimoc (drug 
import company) 
4. What has Price changes after Price changes, Databases, 
happened with strengthening patent Problems encountered, relevant literature, 
otherLDCs' protection. Benefits observed libraries 
pharmaceutical Negative/positive effects in (University of 
prices after relation to pharmaceuticals Cape Town, 
,. 
19 patent Mozambican 
. , .. 
pI 
I 
The instruments used for the collection of primary data were structured interviews and 
for secondary data the researcher reviewed relevant literature. With regards to the 












The first objective is analysed in chapter six, whereby the laws and regulations in the 
pharmaceutical industry are described. The changes made for the adjustment of the 
intellectual property rights legislation to accommodate TRIPS will also be looked at 
with a vivid description of the national IPRs legislation in the country. This is done in 
order to critically view what laws exist in the country and see whether or not there is a 
gap between the national laws and the TRIPS required laws. 
The second objective, which looks at the likely impact of TRIPS for anti-malarial 
drugs, based on scenarios that show what happens when we have generics and 
patented drugs, is also analysed in chapter six. Lastly, the third objective is analysed 
in chapter five. The results of other countries' experiences will be of vast importance 
to the conclusion of this research because we can not conclude much about 
Mozambique seeing as they have not experienced much on patent protection hence 














The importance of this chapter is to show us where it all began, in terms of 
international agreements because it did not start with WTO. This chapter takes us a 
step back to trade and how things changed in the area of trade and intellectual 
property after the introduction of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property. 
These changes are of utmost importance because important decisions are removed 
from the national level to the global level. At the national level, it has made policy 
makers much more aware of the increased international implications of their policy 
actions. Policies that might appear sustainable within a national context may appear 
less so in an international one. 
The rest of the chapter defmes TRIPS and describes the provisions entailed in this 
agreement and relates its basic features within the context of the developed countries 
and developing countries as well as its limitations. Finally the provisions within the 
agreement that are meant to facilitate implementation in developing countries are very 
well defined. 
4.1 The Genesis of GATT and the Emergence of the TRIPS Agreement 
The TRIPS Agreement, together with the 1968 Stockholm Conference that adopted 
the revised Berne and Paris Conventions and created the World Intellectual Property 
Organisations (WIPO), was certainly the most significant milestone in the 
development of intellectual property in that century. Looking back at the history of 
intellectual property it is easier to understand how it all began. The system governing 
world monetary movements was established at Bretton Woods in July 1944. It 
constituted the first half of the economics sector of the new world organisation that 
was under construction at the time, and which later became the United Nations. Trade 
was to receive its own world body, the ITO. The latter was launched in 1946 for the 
purpose of promoting the expansion of trade and production, exchange and 











After a second Conference was convened in August 1947 a draft Contract was 
submitted to governments and the results of discussions on this draft were combined 
in the text of GATT, which was signed at Geneva on October 30, 1947 by 
representatives of 25 governments. Provisional applications of GATT began as of 
January 1, 1948. The full United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment was 
then held at Havana, which formed the ITO Agreement, but this never came into force 
as the United States Congress rejected it (Subramanian, 1990). 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, 23 nations signed the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade, a treaty that aimed at an increased freedom international trade 
through unending negotiations. The Uruguay Round, also known as the eighth round, 
had duration of 8 years having commenced in 1986 and ending in 1994. The latter 
ended with the proliferation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the 1st of 
January 1995, which until the 1 st of January 2002 had 144 member states. 
The World Trade Organisation is the international organisation dealing with the rules 
of trade between nations. Within this organisation there are certain agreements, which 
are negotiated and signed by WTO members. These agreements include goods (the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or GATT), services (the General Agreement 
on Trade in services or GATS) and intellectual property (the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPs). The latter is the one 
agreement that this paper is interested in. 
4.2 Defining TRIPS 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property is only one of the 26 agreements found 
in the WTO convention. The TRIPS agreement incorporates both intellectual 
(copyright and neighbouring rights) and industrial property (trademarks, patents, 
geographical indicators, industrial designs, and trade secrets). The TRIPS agreement 
prescribes a minimum standard of intellectual property protection for WTO members. 
For industrialised countries, intellectual property rights are of vast importance 
because their competitive boundary lies in R&D in high technological areas. Without 
this kind of protection it would not be easy for the firms in these countries to be 












Less developed countries or rather, countries without the capacity to innovate, on the 
other hand, before TRlPS, relied on reproducing what innovators developed. This is 
the reason why these countries were not in favour of such protection since they 
perceived it as harmful to their development, given the fact that without being able to 
imitate invented products they would not have adequate access to products from 
developed countries. Towards the end of this chapter more will be said about the 
practical examples that have originated from the mentioned harm caused by this 
protection. 
One of the articles in the agreement (33 to be precise) state that protection offered for 
a patented product only expires after 20 years. This may lead to an increase in the 
duration of the patent owner's monopoly in many Member states that do not have 
competition. In the pharmaceutical area the most likely result of this provision would 
be that drug prices might increase just like any other monopoly product, for a longer 
period of time. Another consequence of this provision is that manufactures of generic 
products will have to wait for 20 years before they can produce the particular drug 
and sell it at a more reasonable price (Correa, 2000). 
Article 7 of this agreement lays down a general principle that the protection and 
implementation of IPRs should contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology. Everyone concerned 
(producers and users of technological knowledge) should benefit from this. This 
article essentially establishes a balanced framework for TRlPS whereby the rights of 
owners of IPRs are balanced against the needs of users or consumers. Article 8 allows 
WTO members to take appropriate measures, consistent with other provisions of 
TRlPS, to enhance public or national interest including measures to prevent abuse or 
resort to practices, which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology. This provision makes more sense for developing 
countries where members can adopt measures necessary to protect public health. 
Intellectual property rights are exhausted once the goods or services, which 
incorporate these rights, are launched on the market. This implies that once a 
patented, trademarked, or copyrighted article has been soled by the IPR owner, the 











This process is called the exhaustion of rights and is accepted in all countries, 
depending on their national authorities (Correa, 2000). 
Article 6 of the TRIPs agreement on exhaustion does not prohibit the freedom of 
WTO members on the question of exhaustion of IPRs as long as national treatment 
and most favoured nation are accorded. Some view these terms as the key option for 
developing countries to satisfy the adverse impact of strengthened intellectual 
property protection, and also to reduce the unfair duplication of the rights of IPR 
holders. We will see more of this impact in the next few sections, especially where 
drugs are concerned. 
4.3 Trade and Intellectual Property Rights (North-South) 
Trade requires a certain guarantee for the proprietary of traded goods hence the 
performance of trade depends, at least partly, on property rights. Intellectual property 
rights fulfil the function of enhancing domestic innovation and attracting 
multinational companies. But the problem is that developed and less developed 
countries see this view in two different ways and because of this difference the flow 
of international trade and investment becomes constrained. According to Schott, 
(2000) the close relationship between trade and foreign direct investment makes it 
difficult to distinguish their individual dependency on intellectual property rights. 
With weak patent protection, companies could, for instance, shift from exports to 
foreign direct investment in order to retain control over technological information. 
Stronger patent laws attract greater bilateral trade across all nations. 
Maskus and Penurbati (1995) assume that trade is a positive function that arises out of 
the intellectual property right system. This basically tells us that without intellectual 
property rights countries would not have the incentive to trade. According to Correa, 
the TRIPS agreement was not only conceived as an instrument to combat imitation of 
invented products. "The agreement was also regarded as a component of a policy of 
technological protectionism aimed at consolidating an international division of labour 
whereby Northern countries generate innovations and Southern countries constitute 
the market for the resulting products and services" (Correa, 2000). This new 












The TRIPS agreement does leave some space for national authorities to control their 
own countries but with so many restrictions available in it this space leaves much to 
be desired. This is an irony because industrialised countries also criticise TRIPS, 
arguing that it does not constitute an international system of protection given that they 
leave the implementation of rights to the Member states. The TRIPS agreement does 
not give special attention to the fact that the North and the South have significant 
economic and technological differences and capabilities; it ignores the fact that these 
countries demand different products. 
Developing countries' share in world R&D expenses is insignificant hence their 
dependency on innovations made in the North (Correa, ibid). The patent statistics 
shows that 95% of 1,650,800 patents granted in the United States between the years 
1977 -1996 were given on applicants from 10 industrialised countries. This left 
developing countries accounting for less than 2% at the time7• The fact that 
developing countries have such a small share in the trade of medium and high tech 
goods shows us that the new international rule on intellectual property rights is in 
favour of industrialised countries. This leaves a big question as to what the aim of 
increased patent protection is; is it really to the advantage of the world or is it a way 
of the industrialised countries reinforcing their power over the world. 
Despite the origins and main objectives behind the TRIPS agreement, as mentioned 
earlier, this agreement still has elements that may allow a certain balance in its 
implementation. According to the agreement, its main goal is to reduce conflicts and 
impediments to international trade. 
In Watal's words (2001), "all intellectual property rights can be broadly held to grant 
a right to exclude others from certain unauthorised acts with respect to the subject 
matter of protection". These rights are granted under national law to avoid unfair 
competition whilst at the same time encouraging innovation and other creative 
activities. In the context of the TRIPS Agreement, IPRs that directly reflect the 
objective of encouraging creative or inventive activity include patents, copyright 
related rights, industrial designs and layout designs. These IPRs are meant to grant 











market power through legal exclusivity, although limited in time and scope. Because 
of the way society views these rights (Le. they recognise that public interest or welfare 
may suffer with the grant of this monopoly power) they do not go without exceptions. 
But even though there are exceptions these cannot be such that the objective or 
rewarding creativity is defeated. 
The next section looks at measures that have and can be taken to alleviate developing 
countries from the likely consequences of the TRIPS Agreement. 
4.4 Transitional period arrangements 
According to the TRIPS agreement parties shall take all necessary steps to ensure that 
conformity of their laws, regulations and practices within the provisions of this Annex 
in a period of X years is put into force. Developing countries, which face special 
problems in the preparation and implementation of intellectual property laws, dispose 
of an additional period not exceeding Y years. WTO Members have to implement the 
TRIPS Agreement as a part of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, signed at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994. In 
Gervais's words, the Agreement creates obligations not only to change laws but also 
to implement reasonable changes to intellectual property laws or judicial procedures 
(Gervais, D. 1998). 
With the view to achieve full and successful adjustment and compliance with levels of 
protection and enforcement set forth in this agreement; least developed parties are not 
expected to apply such standard for a period of a total years. The WTO generally 
accepts the United Nations list of least developed countries. Under the provisions of 
Article 66(1), least developed WTO Members benefit from a transitional period until 
January 1, 2006 to apply the TRIPS Agreement (other Articles 3, 4 and 5), with 
possible extensions by the TRIPS Council. The Article justifies the need for this 
transitional period: "the special needs and requirements of least-developed country 
Members, their economic, financial and administrative constraints and their need for 
flexibility to create a viable technological base". 
The next sections will look at whether or not the granting of compulsory licenses or 
the admission of parallel imports by some developing countries threaten the long term 











markets already provide a significant amount of resources for R&D, and the 
pharmaceutical firms have had large sales in many developing countries, even in the 
absence of patent protection. In Brazil and Mexico for instance the large 
pharmaceutical firms already controlled the largest part of the markets before the 
introduction of product patent protection in the 1990s (Correa, 2002). Additionally, 
the contribution to R&D that could be made by some developing countries is 
insignificant in global terms. For instance, in Africa, one of the regions where the 
problems of access to drugs are more severe only accounts for around 1.3% of world 
pharmaceutical sales (Correa, 2001). The next section will give a more detailed view 
on compulsory licenses and parallel imports. 
4.5 Compulsory licensing 
A compulsory license is an approval granted by the government without the 
authorization of the patent holder. Under the TRIPS agreement, countries have the 
right to issue such licenses regulated in accordance with the agreement (Article 31). 
There are different grounds under which to issue compulsory licenses such as public 
health, emergency situations, epidemics, protecting the environment and others. It all 
depends on the national law to decide which are the grounds. In Germany for 
instance, the law states that compulsory licensing is permitted for reasons of public 
interest. 
TRlPS has set five specific conditions under which compulsory licensing can be 
granted. These conditions are: 
1) Refusal to deal 
2) Emergency and extreme urgency 
3) Anti-competitive practices 
4) Non-commercial use 
5) Dependent patents 
Although the TRlPS Agreement has set these five specific conditions for the grant of 
compulsory license, it does not prohibit the Members' rights to create compulsory 
licenses on other grounds not clearly stated in the Agreement such as public interest. 
The only case that is denied freedom relates to semi-conductor technology, which is 












Licenses to remedy anti-competitive practices require some form of compensation 
payment to the patent holder. According to Correa, most countries provide for 
different modalities of compulsory licenses; the US Government is one example, 
which has made extensive use of compulsory licenses for governmental use, which 
has led to complaints from the European Union. Although the agreement does not 
limit the grounds for the allowance of compulsory licences, those that want the latter 
granted must respect the following conditions: . 
a) Case-by-case evaluation and decision 
b) Prior request to the patentee for a voluntary licence 
c) Determination of scope and duration of the compulsory licence 
d) Non-exclusivity 
e) Non-assignability 
f) Preferably for the domestic market 
g) Remuneration 
h) Possibility of requesting the revision of decisions and the revocation of the 
licence 
There is enough room left for interpretation at the national level of the criteria to 
determine when remuneration is to be deemed adequate, but it should take into 
account the economic value of the authorization. In the case of a compulsory licence 
to provide drugs to a population that would otherwise be unable to afford those drugs, 
it could be argued that the patent holder lost nothing. It must be determined in each 
individual case, taking into consideration the circumstances of the licensee and of the 
market where it operates, as well as the purpose of the licence. 
The possibility of revocation of the licence, if too strictly applied, may defeat the 
whole system of compulsory licensing, since the more effective a compulsory licence 
is, the sooner the licensee may lose his rights (Correa, 1994). But as it has been said, 
each case is treated differently, for instance, if a compulsory licence is issued to 
remedy anti-competitive practices, many of the conditions do not apply, such as the 
requirement to first try to obtain a voluntary licence. Also the fact that a decision to 











judicial review; TRIPS only requires that the review is independent, so countries may 
opt for an administrative review, which is faster. 
One may say that compulsory licensing is a way of controlling the abuse of monopoly 
power by the patent holder. When the latter thinks of abusing his rights he may think 
twice about it with the fear that he will face compulsory licensing for his product. 
This in some way may prevent malpractice and misuse of monopoly rights, hence 
making it a necessary element in any intellectual property rights law. But the only 
way this system can be effective is only if the grounds set within it are as transparent 
as possible. 
4.6 Parallel importation 
Parallel importation refers to the importation, without permission of the patent owner, 
into a country of a product from a third country, where this product has been marketed 
by the patent holder or in another legitimate way. It is mostly used when the price in 
the third country is considerably lower than the price the patent holder charges in the 
country concerned. Under the TRIPS Agreement, parallel import is allowed whereby 
countries are given the freedom to determine their own policy in respect to parallel 
imports. As stated in Article 1, the method of implementing the TRIPS provisions can 
be freely determined within the own legal system and practice of each country. Article 
6 leaves each country with the room to incorporate the principle of international 
exhaustion of rights in its national legislation. This means any Member can determine 
the extent to which the principle of exhaustion of rights is applied in its own control, 
without breaking any obligation under the Agreement. 
Although there is an argument that parallel imports in developing countries will 
increase the level of non-genuine products, it is very clear that this policy has a 
positive effect on developing countries. In markets such as the pharmaceutical market 
whereby there is an extensive exercise of price discrimination (where prices for the 
same product can vary considerably between countries) parallel imports may play a 
major role in preventing preferential prices for developing countries. In the 
pharmaceutical area, by allowing the importation of a patented medicine from a 
country where it is sold cheaper than in the importing country, access to the product 











therein be regarded as one of the measures, consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, 
that Member countries are explicitly authorized to take to protect public health 
(Article 8.1 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
Some argue strongly against parallel trade in products protected by IPRs, especially 
pharmaceuticals. In the case of patents it is argued that the terms allowing the 
exclusive right of importation, as well as the terms prohibiting any discrimination on 
grounds of whether the product is imported or domestically produced, leads to an 
obligation to restrict parallel imports. But Article 6 does not take away the right of 
patent owners to prevent importation by third parties. Supporters of this view argue 
that in the case of pharmaceuticals, parallel trade would decrease incentives for 
innovation (Watal, 2000). Also, if parallel import increases, there would be less of 
price discrimination. 
Most developed countries are against parallel trade in patented products; actually 
most of them continue to follow policies of national exhaustion, disallowing parallel 
imports. Developing countries on the other hand highly support parallel importation 
because they always questioned whether or not this would help them achieve their 
objective of gaining access to newer and more effective (patented) medicines at 
sensible prices. This is one of the objectives that led South Africa to amend its 
Medicines Act to allow for parallel imports of medicines. After strong oppositions 
and pressure from the US and European based pharmaceutical companies, the South 
African government amended its policies and an agreement was reached that South 
Africa would respect TRIPS. 
The Thai patent law gives way to importation of patented products if the patentee has 
approved to the manufacture or sale of the product elsewhere. But Watal argues 
against international exhaustion policies aimed to benefit consumers in certain 
developing countries through lower prices due to price competition. He says that 
consumers in those other developing countries from which parallel imports are 












Conclusively, from what we have seen in this chapter the present times have been 
hailed as the information age where knowledge constitutes power and a competitive 
edge over competitors. It is therefore in the interest of technology owners that 
knowledge is not easily taken away and they have therefore, pressed for the 
introduction of TRIPS as another barrier to access, and as one of the means of 
controlling knowledge. Attempts to tighten the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights in international conventions by industrialized countries had been unsuccessful 
due to the deadlock in negotiations between industrialized and developing countries 
with differing views, in the Paris Convention. 
But the introduction of the TRIPS agreement, which ended up allowing the 
strengthening of patent protection and according to this chapter as far as the 
pharmaceutical sector is concerned, is likely to lead to an increase in drug prices just 
like any other monopoly product. Some authors argue that without IPRs countries 
would have no incentive to trade. But others stress the fact that developing countries 
have such a small share in the trade of medium and high tech goods, showing us that 
the new international rule on IPRs is in favour of industrialized countries. 
Although there are certain measures, such as compulsory licenses, allowed for 
developing countries to alleviate the potential consequences of the TRIPS Agreement, 
developed countries are not so much in favor of these measures. But as has been 
shown in the previous sections, the grant of a compulsory license has no detrimental 
effect to the patent holder. Both compulsory licenses and parallel importation have a 
positive effect on developing countries because they allow access to products that 













COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: CROSS COUNTRY COMPARISON 
~----~-----
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter looks at different country experiences with regards to TRIPS. As it has 
been mentioned earlier, it is hard to come to a generalized conclusion to this study 
given the fact that different countries experience different consequences in this regard 
but it is essential to have a look at what other countries have gone through either after 
implementing TRIPS or after strengthening their patent protection. 
It will not be easy if possible, to have evidence about the implication of TRIPS 
because TRIPS standards have only just been enforced in many developing countries. 
But even so, given the large coverage of the TRIPS agreement and the differences 
existing among developing countries, it becomes difficult to make a quantitative 
assessment of its likely impact. This is because the levels of economic and 
technological development of these countries are different. What can be looked at is 
the experience of countries that have adopted pharmaceutical patents in the past ten 
years, which is highly relevant in this context. 
Industrialised countries support the argument that patent protection in all fields of 
technology, as annexed in the TRIPS Article 27, would have three main effects in 
developing countries and these are: promote foreign direct investment (FDI), increase 
the diffusion of technology and the promotion of local research and development 
(R&D). Given these expectations with regards to the introduction of patents, it is 
possible to look at how these have implicated on these objectives. With this it does 
not mean that we do not acknowledge the fact that IPRs is only a part of the elements 
that may influence FDI, innovation and technology transfer. 
5.1 Effect on FDI, technology transfer and R&D 
Changes in IPRs are most likely to have a significant impact in countries that are 
more technologically advanced. According to Correa, the effect of reinforced IPRs is 
not only likely to be felt in terms of market prices of protected products, but also with 











productive activities based on imitation. In such countries the effects of changes in 
IPRs will go beyond trade, and involve access to technology and the patterns of 
industrial development (Correa, 2000:24). 
The pharmaceutical industry is among the most R&D intensive industries. The impact 
on R&D expenditures in pharmaceuticals, both domestic and global has been looked 
at in different studies and Argentina found no reason to expect an increase in domestic 
R&D in pharmaceuticals. According to N ogues (1991) the main reason is that the 
development of new chemical entities is outside the reach of local companies in any 
developing country, since there are no firms in these countries big enough to finance 
the high costs of pharmaceutical R&D. 
According to Scherer (1995) less developed countries could be better off if the extra 
profits conveyed to drug firms led to the development of more new drugs and hence 
to a multiplication of consumers' surplus. Scherer found that in Italy since patents 
were granted in 1978 drug product patenting exhibited a strong upward trend before 
the change in the patent regime. With regards to trends in foreign trade after patents 
were introduced, Scherer identified a fast deterioration of the trade balance, which 
turned negative. 
This brings about two important queries and these are (a) what is the extent to which 
the income generated by patents in the developing world is actually invested to 
develop the medicines needed by the poor; and (b) what is the extent to which the 
granting of patents in developing countries, under conditions substantially similar to 
those applicable in developed countries, is essential to provide incentives for 
industry's global R&D activities (Lanjouw, 2001). 
In some Latin American countries, such as, Chili and Colombia, the introduction of 
patents in pharmaceuticals in 199011991 has not led to any increase in FDI in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Foreign companies have taken hold of local companies but 
new investment has not taken place. An ASEAN workshop on the TRIPs Agreement 
done in 2000 found that a high number of formulation plants have been shut down. 
With this we can conclude that the introduction of the patents in these countries has 











than producing locally. This has meant an increase in trade deficit caused by the 
substitution of local production by direct import. 
The same pretty much applies to technology transfer and pharmaceutical R&D in 
these countries, which has not been positive at all. The authors of the ASEAN 
workshop say, "license agreements usually mean that the patent holder provides the 
active ingredient, not the technology for the production of the active ingredient, and 
the licensee is usually just formulating" (2000). These countries have not experienced 
an increase in pharmaceutical R&D and we have to acknowledge the fact that if R&D 
is to increase it has to come from developing countries which is ironical since there is 
a lack of human capital. It has been clearly pointed out by different authors that there 
is hardly any hope that R&D for diseases relevant to developing countries will 
augment in industrialised countries. 
A study done by the WHO collaborating Centre for Health Economics assessed the 
impact of the introduction of pharmaceutical product and process patents in Thailand 
and found some similarities with the countries mentioned above. After the enactment 
of the 1992 patent act, there has been no significant increase in technology transfer 
that could lead to R&D of new pharmaceutical products in Thailand; in fact, there has 
been more reliance from imports of drugs as compared to local products. Foreign 
companies have more to gain from change in patent law than local companies, "the 
share of originator products as percentage of the total pharmaceutical market 
increased, on average by 4% per year" (WHO 2000). FDI has also been stagnant since 
1992. 
The following graph shows what has happened in Thailand with regards to technology 
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Source: Bulletin of the WHO, 2001 
As has been said and as is shown in the above graph, there has not been much 
technology transfer to or FDI in the Thai pharmaceutical industry since 1992. As we 
can see in the graph, between 1997 and 98 there has been no transfer of FDI at all. 
Between these years be total share value in Thai ownership was 79.4% and 20.7% in 
foreign ownership. From 1992 to 96 alone we see a total share value of74.9% in Thai 
ownership, leaving 2.5.1 % on foreign ownership. The industry is still rather small 
compared with other production sectors. The data on Thai pharmaceutical companies 
registered from 1984 to 1998 indicated that there were more Thai than foreign 
shareholders, reflecting the fact that little FDI is flowing into the industry. 
This could reflect a trend in the pharmaceutical industry's foreign direct investment, 
in the sense that as costs of R&D increase there is a tendency for drug companies to 
merge and join forces hence further reducing the transfer of FDIs. The more and more 
large companies merge the bigger they get so as to disperse their investment risks, 
maybe because they fear being vulnerable. The consequence of this event will 
certainly be negative on developing countries because the bigger the firms become the 
less likely they are to transfer FDI to developing countries. 
The Thai and other countries' evidence show us that the promIses (i.e. having 











investment flows to developing countries, therein fostering their participation in trade 
and economic development) made by developed countries are far from taking place. 
As shown by the above countries, imports of drugs from developed countries are on 
the increase. As Correa (2000) puts it, "the negotiation on TRIPs was presented by 
developed countries as a necessary condition to promote innovation and to stimulate 
technology and capital flows to developing countries with the assumption that both 
countries will benefit alike from IPRs. It remains unproven however, that reinforced 
protection of IPRs worldwide shall increase the flows of capital and technology to 
developing countries". 
5.2 Effect on drug prices 
Pharmaceutical patents by design and function increase the price of medicines to 
consumers. According to Abbott (2000) patents enable pharmaceutical manufacturers 
to sustain prices higher than their marginal costs of production by discouraging the 
emergence of competitors. The United States and the OECD pharmaceutical industry 
have argued that price is only one factor in determining access to medicines in 
developing countries, and infrastructure and professional support must also be 
addressed. Yet this is hardly an argument against measures that would lower the price 
of patented pharmaceuticals. 
For a developing country, the grant of pharmaceutical patent protection almost 
certainly means increasing payments to U.S, European or Japan based pharmaceutical 
companies. As a general proposition, the U.S will be by far the largest beneficiary of 
the patent provisions of the TRIPS agreement. As a consequence of TRIPS 
implementation, there will be large rent transfers from the developing countries to 
wealthier developed countries. 
In Italy, the establishment of patent protection took place in 1978. This country was 
previously not doing so badly in the production and exportation of pharmaceutical 
products. After the introduction of patents drug prices increased dramatically in this 
country by almost 200% and this led to an increase in the net imports of 
pharmaceutical products. Their incredible trade surplus in pharmaceutical products 











In the case of HI V drugs for instance, the drug d4T, one of the components ofa dual 
therapy to slow the progression of the AIDS virus, which Bristol· Myers Squibb sells 
under the brand name Zerit, saw an increase in price. The drug was synthesized by 
Michigan Cancer Foundation in 1966 with the utilization of public funds, and its use 
to treat AIDS was discovered by Yale University, which holds a patent. Despite the 
public funding for R&D, Zerit is reported to sell at a price considerably higher than 
the product available from generic producers (Rosenberg, 2001). 
5.3 Benefits of Intellectual Property Protection to Developing countries 
Progress in intellectual property protection has occurred because countries all over the 
world have recognized that such protection encourages investment, innovation, and 
economic growth. Strong intellectual property protection not only benefits research-
based pharmaceutical companies and the patients they serve; it also helps developing 
nations by enhancing the conditions for investment, encouraging the development of 
local industry, and enabling more goods to be produced. 
In the international innovative pharmaceutical industry's perspective (IFPMA) new 
medicines and access to these medicines, which are of utmost importance in the fight 
against communicable and non-communicable diseases, are dependent on strong 
patent protection and other intellectual property protection. They argue that the patent 
system represents a compromise between competing short-term and long-term 
economic and social interests. It allows the private pharmaceutical industry to operate 
and make a contribution to a socially driven public health sector by providing it with 
cost-effective new teclmologies. 
While the commercial sector discovers and develops nearly all new drugs and 
vaccines, this is done within certain risks; the patent system therefore provides the 
incentive necessary to investigate and invest millions of dollars in R&D. The 
following table shows us the importance of patent protection for development of 
innovative products in various industries. 
Diagram 5.2: importance of patent protection for development of innovative products 
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Source: patents and innovation: an empirical study by Mansfield, Management Science, 1986 
As is shown in the diagram, the dependence of pharmaceutical discovery and 
development on adequate intellectual property rights is the highest among various 
sectors. The diagram shows us that the first rank is held by the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
A 1994 World Bank study found that "the strength or weakness of a country's system 
of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect, particularly in 
high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by many u.s. firms 
to that country (Mansfield, 1994). According to the study, 86-100 percent of leading 
U.S., German, and Japanese chemical and drug companies reported that a country's 
system of intellectual property protection has a major impact on their decision to 
invest--or not to invest-in research and development facilities in that country. 
This conclusion is supported by empirical examples. Italy, for instance, instituted a 
strong patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 1978. In that year, there were only 123 
billion lira invested in local pharmaceutical R&D. Ten years later, that investment had 











1994). But as has been mentioned before, the Italian drug industry has faced an 
increase in prices of drugs since the introduction of patents, hence what we see in this 
case are double results. 
Korea adopted pharmaceutical-patent protection in the late 1980s. Since that time, 
local pharmaceutical companies have increased their share of the Korean 
pharmaceutical market. Mexico adopted a strong patent law in 1991. Since then, U.S. 
R&D investment in pharmaceuticals in Mexico has more than doubled. Canada, after 
strengthening intellectual property protection, experienced dramatic growth in R&D 
investment. In 1979,2.7 percent of pharmaceutical sales were invested in R&D. That 
figure had increased to 15.7 percent by 1997, according to the Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of Canada (PMAC). 
Between 1987 and 1997, pharmaceutical research spending in Canada rose by more 
than 700 percent, and new R&D investment exceeded $4.6 billion. The PMAC 
estimates that almost 3,500 new jobs have been created as a result of the 
strengthening of pharmaceutical-patent protection (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association of Canada, Annual Review, 1998-1999). 
Brazil enacted strong intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals in May 
1996. Since it became clear that Brazil would protect pharmaceutical patents, 
multinational pharmaceutical companies have announced investments worth hundreds 
of millions of dollars in the country, creating jobs, stimulating the economy, and 
improving health by making state-of-the-art medicines available (The Buenos Aires 
Herald, June 18, 1996). 
Some developing nations have argued that they cannot afford patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals because their people need inexpensive medicines. Experience has 
proven, however, that lack of patent protection not only deprives people in such 
countries of state-of-the-art medicines, but also impedes the competition that can 
lower drug prices. 
A 1990 study by the Latin American Economics Foundation stated that "the non-











to safeguard public health, has presently turned into an instrument to protect local 
industry." In countries that provide pharmaceutical patent protection, consumers 
benefit from the lower prices brought about when patents expire and generic 
competitors enter the market. For example, the ulcer drug Tagamet (cimetidine) lost 
U.S. patent protection in 1994. Within weeks, generic copies were introduced at 
prices 30 to 60 percent lower than that of the original product. 
By contrast, in countries without pharmaceutical patent protection, there is little price 
competition. What competition exists is based on the strength of sales forces, the date 
of introduction of the products, brand loyalty, and other factors of little benefit to 
consumers. In fact, a survey by the Latin American Economics Foundation of prices 
in Argentina found that copied drugs in that country are, on average, priced higher 
than an originator's product. In such cases, the consumer pays twice. First, the 
consumer often pays a higher price-relative to income, prices of the original product, 
and even prices in the United States. Second, the price the consumer pays does not 
contribute to pharmaceutical research for future medical breakthroughs. In the U.S., 
for example, about 20.8 percent of the revenue of research-based companies is 
reinvested in R&D. Strong intellectual property protection is absolutely essential for 
pharmaceutical companies to invest in research-which leads to the discovery and 
development of more cures and better treatments for patients all over the world. 
But this is still debatable, because there is evidence from both sides of the coin that 
intellectual property rights are good/bad for the pharmaceutical industry. It could be 
that those countries benefiting most from these rights are already well developed 
countries and the same cannot be said for less developed countries or countries 
without technological advantages. Most developing countries, for instance have no 
patent protection rights at all and this scenario does not help us understand how these 
countries are supposed to benefit from patent protection if all their existence they 
have not been using them. 
5.4 International price discrimination 
A cross-country analysis, done by Schut et al (ibid) based on prices of packages of 
pharmaceutical products to test that the pharmaceutical industry practices 











monopolistic power of these industries leads to a behaviour in which competitive 
forces have no major role in the determination of prices such that competition is 
mainly pursued by means of innovation and product differentiation, supported by 
trademarks. 
Being one of the most innovative industries, the pharmaceutical industry goes through 
extreme uncertainty on the supply side of the market and hence looks for protection 
against this event through thorough use of patents (to protect the innovation) and 
trademarks (to protect the product against me-too duplicates). What adds to this 
problem is the fact that the drug market has a very low price elasticity of demand due 
to the fact that it is a commodity mostly purchased out of necessity. According to this 
study there are not only large differences between the quotations of different 
companies but the same companies have prices that vary by 400 per cent from one 
country to another. Differences in price result because manufacturers apply typical 
profit maximizing strategies based on the price sensitivity of buyers; those buyers less 
sensitive to price pay more. 
The fact that there is a high degree of product differentiation and the fact that the 
pharmaceutical industry are most of time unwilling to publish comprehensive 
information about their actual transaction prices, makes it unquestionable to find 
information about prices of pharmaceutical products scattered, especially when 
developing countries are concerned. 
There is recognition that it is a difficult task to compare domestic prices of different 
countries by simply converting them at market exchange rates into a common 
currency unit, especially for developing countries that are characterized by fluctuating 
currencies. This certainly produces biased results seeing as exchange rates do not 
necessarily reflect the relative purchasing power of the currencies. After all, the 
market exchange rate applies to internationally traded goods hence comparisons may 
be misleading. According to Barnett (1980:481) in Ghana if imported drugs where 
valued at a rate of exchange, which valued the relative resource cost of producing 
goods domestically and abroad, the drug bill in domestic currency would certainly be 











Because of these problems Schut et al used the purchasing power parity (PPP) of each 
country (of the 32 they studied) for the category drugs and Medical preparations to 
construct price indices with respect to the U.S as base country. What they took note of 
is the fad that if a large number of countries are included in multilateral comparisons, 
an effort to produce a common list of drugs will result in too short a list or in pricing 
items that are not representative for all countries. So, for this reason the price indices 
shown in their findings were regarded as indicative instead of an accurate measure of 
the relative price differences among countries. 
Their findings show that government policies to control prices are the most successful 
in lowering the price level of pharmaceuticals. Implementation of direct price control 
measures implies, on average, a more than 20% decrease in drug prices. It also shows 
that although excluding pharmaceutical products from patent protection also 
influences the price level of drugs in a downward direction by about 10%, their effect 
is less convincing. 
Chudnosvsky (1983) and Lall et al (1977) support this argument by agreeing that the 
lack of patent protection or weak patent protection has not seriously affected the way 
transnational co-operations operate in developing countries. They argue that patents 
are an important instrument to reinforce the market power of leading firms but they 
are not the main source of that power. Chudnosky adds that a slight change in patent 
legislation is not enough to change the structure of the pharmaceutical industry in 
developing countries or to reduce the prices of pharmaceutical products and imports. 
He votes for a combined policy of excluding patent protection and promoting the use 
of generics so as to reduce the price level of drugs. Sri Lanka proved that a 
comprehensive drug policy can reduce the price level of drugs (patel, 1983). 
International pnce discrimination sometimes results in lower prices for poorer 
countries but the fact that drug prices vary randomly, depending on the existence and 
level of success of a national drug policy, means much higher prices than necessary 
for many poor countries with close to no possibilities to establish a successful drug 
policy. Although the drug prices in developing countries are often lower than in 
developed countries, the real costs of these products are still higher. According to 











and Sri Lanka experiences about 60% higher real costs. But this is likely to be 
because of the different levels of economic conditions in the countries facing such 
differences in price. 
The fact that total expenditure on pharmaceuticals increases more than double times 
from year to year should alert developing countries of the likely consequence of 
severe constraints on the development of other essentially needed health services. 
Price controls are therefore of vital importance for developing countries, especially 
those that regulate the price level of drugs. Some authors suggest that the solution 
would be an exclusion of some drugs, depending on local needs, from patent 
protection, but with the TRIPS agreement this is unlikely. 
5.5 Generic drugs vs patented drugs 
The market share of generic drugs has been rising. The Hacth-Waxman Act 
encouraged the entry of generic drugs by establishing an abbreviated approval process 
for generic versions of all nonantibiotic drugs. In addition, the act reversed a 1984 
court ruling and allowed generic manufacturers to begin the tests required for FDA 
approval before the patent on the innovator drug they were copying had expired. 
These changes increased the probability that a generic copy would become available 
after patent expiration and reduced the average delay between patent expiration and 
generic entry from more than three years to less than three months. 
The increase in generic sales since 1984 has brought down average prices for drugs 
that are no longer under patent protection. But these lower prices do not result from 
reductions in the price of the original drug when it begins to face competition from 
generic drugs but because consumers now have a choice to substitute one drug for 
another. This means more competition for generic manufacturers since they sell 
identical products. The increased use of generic drugs has lowered total spending on 
brand name drugs (according to Smith, the purchase of generic drugs reduces the cost 
of brand name, at retail prices, by roughly $8-10 billion in 1994). The added 
competition created by generic drugs keeps the manufacturer of the breakthrough 











But this is not to say innovator drugs manufacturers loose out on profit because of the 
introduction of generics because the initial high prices they charge allows them to 
recover their investment in a drug's discovery and development. Studies have found 
that on average discovering and developing a drug takes about 12 years and costs 
about $200 million per successful product in terms of the 1990-dollar rate 
(Grabowski et al. 1994). This amount of money includes the cost of drugs that never 
make it to the market and also accounts for the cost of capital, that is, the cost of 
waiting for a return until the drug is introduced. 
The after tax profits over the life of a typical innovator drug changes. The first 12 
years show a negative cash flow while the drug is being developed, undergoing 
testing, and awaiting approvaL But when the drug is marketed over the next 20 years 
it earns back a return on the investment in its R&D. According to two studies, that 
profit stream has an average present value of $220-230 million, after deducting 
manufacturing, advertising, distribution and other non-R&D-related costs, which 
more than compensates for the $200 million in average capitalized costs of drug 
development. These studies estimate that for innovator drugs introduced in the early 
1980s, after tax profits exceed development costs by $22-36 million, on average, 
(Grabowski et al. ibid.) 
At the end of day manufacturers of breakthrough drugs are not at any critical loss 
when counterfeits are introduced because the growth of the latter does not offset the 
sales that the breakthrough drug loses to its new competitors. And besides, the 
introduction of a counterfeit does not imply that the price of brand name drugs drops 
immediately after the former is placed in the market, it takes time and within that time 
the manufacturers of the brand name are still making excessive profits. Competition 
from generics does not therefore result in a loss for innovators but results in firms' 
earning close to a normal rate of return to their R&D investment, on average. The 
difference is that instead of earning abnormal profits, firms now earn normal profits 
and that is the problem. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Conclusively, one of the arguments from developed countries, in favour of patent 











technology and investment flows to developing countries, therein promoting their 
participation in trade and economic development. Developed countries also offered 
the multilateral way as a means to reduce trade tensions and avoid the use of 
independent punishment, probably with the recognition that unilateral retaliation is 
not in favour of a positive trade environment. But evidence does not show us these 
promises materialising but what we see is the new multilateral disciplines increasing 
exports from developed countries, while the well-being of the majority of the 
population are becoming more visible in developing countries. 
We should never forget that the negotiation on TRIPS was presented by developed 
countries as a necessary condition to promote innovation and to stimulate technology 
and capital flows to developing countries. Like Correa says, the TRIPS agreement 
represented a great victory for the large pharmaceutical companies. This was a major 
breakthrough for them because it was the first time an international agreement obliged 
to grant patents on pharmaceutical products, under which trade sanctions may be 
applied against non-complying countries. The assumption was that both countries 
would benefit equally from IPRs. But all these benefits remain unproven. Basically, 
the argument suggests that the failure to grant appropriate IPRs protection, including 
in developing countries, would reduce the future flows of funds for R&D and lead to a 
deadly fall in the innovation performance by the industry. 
What is evident from this chapter is that the consequences that take place due to the 
TRIPS Agreement vary from country, making it even harder to come a generalised 
conclusion. There is a difference between what happens in low and middle-income 
countries. The majority of the African states for instance, follow the common-law 
system, although some follow the French and Portuguese (as is the case for 
Mozambique) civil system. The methodology of IPR enforcement procedures will 
naturally reflect the problems that are inherent in these neo-coloniallegal systems and 
their perception of this whole concept of intellectual property. These regions and/or 
countries have different institutional capacities to implement these laws hence the 
difference in the results that we see in this paper. Some of them are slightly advanced 
technologically and this means a different set of results and some are premature, 











But as we can see from this chapter it is not only country differences but there are also 
conflicting results within countries. Italy is an example of a country that has shown 
conflicting results from the enactment of their patent laws. If we look at it from the 
point of view of the effects of TRIPS on FDI, technology transfer, R&D and drug 
prices, we can see that there are some positive effects on one side and negative effects 
on others. We saw from that country experience that although there was a positive 
impact on FDI, shown by an increase in foreign investments after the introduction of a 
strong patent protection, the Italian drug industry, their market as well as consumers 
faced an increase in prices of drugs. Double results are therefore expected from 
different countries and/or regions, and this makes it difficult to come up with a unified 












FINDINGS: THE CASE OF MOZAMBIQUE 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter reports the findings of the study with regards to the specified objectives 
in chapter 1. The first objective will be discussed in this chapter, whereby we 
critically describe the laws and regulations of the pharmaceutical sector in 
Mozambique. The second objective, which examines the likely implications of TRIPS 
for anti-malarial drugs in the country, is also described in this chapter. The findings 
from this chapter together with the findings in chapter 5, that is the different country 
experiences, will help us come to a systematic conclusion to this research paper. It is 
important to note though that this conclusion cannot be generalized as we have seen in 
the previous chapters that there is no unified conclusion to the consequence ofTRlPS. 
As the research is looking at the potential impact of TRIPS for Mozambique's anti-
malarial drugs, it is important to give a detailed overview of the malaria situation in 
the country, as well as an overview of anti-malarial drugs as this will help us integrate 
both situations, in terms of the relation between the increased drug resistance and the 
need for new drugs. Other sections will look at how the financing of the 
pharmaceutical sector takes place in the country and describe the market prices of 
anti-malarial drugs in the country; just so to add the importance of the need for funds 
in the country and how that can impact on the country's situation in the sense that 
they cannot afford significantly more expensive drugs that may arise as a consequence 
of being part of the WTO/TRlPS Agreement. 
The rest of the chapters simple show the immatureness of the Mozambican drug 
registration policy as well as their stand with regards to patents; this is to stress that 
the country still has a long way with regards to being ready for enforcing strong 
patent protection. We will start by describing the patent situation in the country. 
6.1 Patents and WTOITRIPS in Mozambique 
In 1966 there was a Portuguese colonial law on intellectual property and Mozambique 











even after independence, the fact that there was no law on property to adhere to meant 
that whenever the need arose the only law that could be used was the Portuguese law. 
Even when used, these laws only benefited the Portuguese. It was not until 2001 that 
Mozambique implemented a law on intellectual property, which is actually called 
industrial property law and within it is incorporated intellectual property rights and 
patents. 
Responsibility for Intellectual property matters is divided between two departments, 
one responsible for patents and other industrial matters and the other responsible for 
copyrights. The country's first law on industrial property protection came into force 
only in 1999 and was finally implemented in 2001. Enforcement on the current 
intellectual property laws is minimal. 
The industrial property code of Mozambique was enacted under the decree no. 18/99 
of 4 May. There are a number of objectives for introducing this law. One of them was 
to create conditions favorable to technological development in the country and get 
access to new industrial, commercial and service related techniques, in order to 
stimulate national and foreign investment through the protection of industrial 
property. They also recognize the fact that industrial property rights are instruments 
for transferring knowledge and new technology and to promote inventive activity in 
the country. 
There are fewer requests for patent protection in Mozambique, most people demand 
trademarks and even so, those that are registered belong foreigners who come to the 
country and request protection. Some of them go via Geneva to protect their products 
and then come to Mozambique with patented products, especially in the industrial 
area. Some are of the view that patent protection is not very beneficial for less 
developed countries, especially in the pharmaceutical area therefore governments 
should not strengthen protection but should limit rights to protection. In Mozambique 
patents are protected solely to attract investors because other than that there are not 
many inventions in the country that would sincerely benefit from patent protection. 
Mozambique signed with the final Act of the Uruguay Round and the Marrakesh 











on 26 August 1995. Under the single undertaking, all WTO multilateral agreement 
were to become binding on Mozambique. Mozambique grants at least most-favored-
nation treatment to all its trading partners. As a developing country it benefits from a 
transition period to implement a number of its commitments under various WTO 
agreements. Mozambique has pursuant to Article 20.1 notified the delayed application 
of the agreement on customs valuation. 
Mozambique's commitment in the WTO falls short of its trade reforms. Mozambique 
certainly needs to more vivid wisdom about WTO rules and regulations. Mozambican 
officials continue the process of preparing legislation and regulations consistent with 
various WTO regulations. Technical assistance is viewed to be essential for the 
country to come into full compliance with its WTO obligations. In general, people 
feel that the price paid by Mozambique to join the multilateral trading system is too 
high; they believe that it might be better for Mozambique to look for benefits within 
the framework of regional integration schemes, especially SADC. TRIPS's efforts to 
modernize domestic legislation are needed, as Mozambique's current intellectual 
property laws date back to the Portuguese administration. 
The possibility that the TRIPS agreement could lead to a concentration of drug 
production in industrialized rather than technology transfer to, or FDI in developing 
countries is likely in Mozambique, especially because this country is at a premature 
stage with drug manufacturing and its laws on patents. 
6.2 Malaria in Mozambique 
Malaria is a major cause of mortality in Southern Africa. Obtaining reliable data on 
malaria mortality is very difficult. Misdiagnosis and unrecorded deaths can mean 
surveillance data can give a misleading picture. However, by using all cause 
population-based mortality rates and hospital data on the proportion of deaths 
attributed to malaria, it is possible to calculate broad malaria mortality estimates. 
Using this method, it is estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 malaria deaths 
occur annually in Southern Africa (Demographic Health Survey, 1997). 
Qualitative reports as well as surveillance data indicate that malaria deaths are rising 











treatment seeking behaviour, quality of care, inadequate transport and communication 
for referral systems to function properly, growing drug resistance and, possibly, HIV. 
The number of malaria cases reported in hospitals has been on the increase for the 
past years. The following graph shows us how cases of malaria have not stopped since 
1993. 
Graph 6.1: Number of malaria cases reported from 1993-98. 
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It is important to note that this is the hospital annual data and hence it does not reflect 
the real picture of the situation because, as has been said before it is very hard to 
obtain the exact figure representing the actual situation; but the trend would only 
change marginally. The reason behind this is because many people, especially in rural 
areas do not report their condition, opting to either go for traditional medication or 
using other measures ~ther than going to the hospital. 
The most important risk groups are under-five year olds, pregnant women and 
travellers who normally reside in unstable or malaria-free areas . Malaria and malaria 
epidemic is a major public health problem experienced in Mozambique and other 











is one of the largest killers in Africa. The following graph illustrates the rate of deaths 
caused by malaria in Southern Africa. 
Graph 6.2: Proportion cf deaths attributed to malaria in Southern Africa. 
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These rates are rather high for a disease that has treatment and is preventable. And as 
has been said before, the under fives are the most vulnerable to this disease. From this 
graph, the most vulnerable countries are Angola, Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania, 
which have a much higher percentage of deaths per 1000 children being caused by 
malaria. Almost 20% of Mozambique's under- five deaths are attributed to malaria, 
and this is pretty high for a curable disease. 
This evidence shows us that there is a need for drugs that will completely eradicate 
the malaria epidemic and if anything the TRIPS Agreement should have a positive 
impact on the availability of these drugs that can help combat this problem. Should 
there be any slight evidence that this agreement is likely to cause more harm than 
good for the country then there should not be any two ways about making the 











There is too much at stake; people's lives, hence this should not be a matter of a test 
that can be passed or failed. 
6.2.1 Anti-malarial drugs in Mozambique 
This section will look at the main anti-malarial drugs used in the public sector 
(Chloroquine and Quinine) in Mozambique, focusing on the resistance to these drugs. 
Chloroquine is the first line drug treatment in the country. 
Antimalarial drug resistance is on the increase and according to the WHO (2000) the 
latter is the "ability of a parasite strain to survive and/or multiply despite the 
administration and absorption of a drug given in doses equal to or higher than those 
usually recommended, but within the limit of tolerance of the subject". The increase 
in chloroquine resistance in East Africa in general and Mozambique in particular has 
increased the malaria mortality rates. In Senegal, West Africa, there has been a 
significant rise in malaria mortality in children under 5 years of age, which highly 
coincides with the emergence of chloroquine resistance in the area. There has also 
been an observation of a severe malaria increase as well as chloroquine resistance 
increase in Malawi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (WHO 2000). 
What we must take into consideration though is that Mozambique should not only 
look at it as resistance to chloroquine but also look at the situation from a broader 
perspective. It is important to consider the context within which we find this 
resistance and ask ourselves whether or not there is no possibility that the drugs are 
not being used adequately or the environment within which we find higher rates of 
mortality are not surrounded by malnutrition and unpurified water that could worsen 
the disease at that point in time. This is not to say there is no resistance to chloroquine 
but it is to encourage the Ministry of Health and other collaborators to resolve the 
whole problem (which is drug resistance and the environment within which most 
occurrences take place). 
The history of resistance started in 1957. Strains of Pfalciparum resistant to 
chloroquine were initially suspected in Thailand way back in 1957 and found in 
patients in Colombia and Thailand in 1960. Since then, there has been a huge spread 











South East Asia, Oceania, the Amazon Basin and other Coastal areas of South 
America. Only in 1979 did Africa start encountering the same problem and this was 
fIrst documented in Tanzania in 1979 and has become like a plague since then. The 
World Health Organisation found that in most East African countries and in Ethiopia 
more than 50% of patients experience a recurrence of parasitaemia with symptoms by 
the 14th day after treatment. Central and Southern Africa only face moderate levels of 
resistance and even lower levels are faced in West Africa. 
Quinine on the other hand has seen a decreasing sensitivity and this has been shown 
in areas of South-East Asia where it has been extensively used as the fIrst-line 
treatment for ma1aria and in some parts of South America. In Mozambique quinine is 
mostly used as an injectable for inpatients. Most of this resistance, especially in 
quinine, could be due to impatience from the patients and when this occurs they tend 
not to complete the treatment. Strains of P Jalciparum from Africa are generally 
highly sensitive to quinine. 
By the end of the year 2000, nine countries had changed their antimalarial treatment 
policies and these are: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Uganda, 
United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Burundi, Eritrea, Ghana, 
Mozambique and Rwanda have started the process of change. 
The reason why this study focuses so much in the issue of drug resistance is mainly 
because the researcher wants to highlight the fact that there is a connection between 
drug resistance and the need for new drugs. Because Mozambique and the other 
countries mentioned above, have a high drug resistance in anti-malarial drugs this 
means that they will at some point need newer drugs to eradicate the problem. As a 
matter of fact, Mozambique is already looking for the best substitute for its fIrst line 
therapy (which is chloroquine) and this substitute is likely to be a drug that is under 
patent since most new drugs are still under patents. 
Anti-ma1arial drugs have become a basic need in Mozambique but if the costs ofthese 
drugs are too exorbitant, the problem of both malaria and drug resistance are not 
likely to be solved. It is because of these high prices that Mozambique prefers to use 











to mind when looking at how much drug resistance there is in African countries, and 
that is, could this mean there has been no research for more effective anti-malarial 
drugs for the past decades. It looks like this is the case, hence taking us to the 
conclusion that industrialised countries have no interest in investing their R&D for 
drugs needed in developing countries but now why so much interest in having the 
latter countries introduce protection on pharmaceutical products. 
Nonetheless, as Mozambique and other African countries embark on the task of 
analysing alternative drugs for malaria they should critically be aware of the fact that 
there are regional differences in patterns of antimalarial drug resistance in countries. 
Policy options therefore should reflect these differences. The decision to change 
therefore should on depend on country circumstances. It is highly acknowledged that 
the options available to countries for improved anti-malarial treatment policies are 
limited, especially in regions of highest resource constraints such as Mozambique. 
In many instances, the lack of resources has resulted in countries continuing the use of 
drugs whose effectiveness is limited by drug resistance. This situation brings us to the 
next section, which will look at the financial situation in Mozambique as far as the 
pharmaceutical sector is concerned. 
6.3 Financing the pharmaceutical sector 
According to the MoH (1995) one of the main problems that affect the logistic of 
medicines in the public sector is the imprecision of the availability of financial 
resources in foreign currency. This imprecision is due to the extreme dependence on 
donors, which are not normally known before hand. There are different types of 
donors in the country and these come at different times of the fiscal year, which does 
not allow the establishment of a normal cycle of funds. 
It has been very difficult to obtain foreign currency to facilitate the importation of 
drugs in Mozambique. The increased debt and the economic crises in the country 
resulted in the total dependence of external financing for the importation of drugs. 
The MoH had no means of financing and distributing drugs. This resulted in a 
disorganized availability of medication in the sense that donors would provide drug in 











moment. Things started changing gradually when bilateral donors eventually left the 
responsibility of procurement decision making on the required drugs in the hands of 
the MoH; their responsibility was to be the donors. 
At this moment the only thing that became uncertain was the amount of fund that 
would come through and when it would come through, that is, in what period it would 
be available. This case scenario prejudiced mainly the level of primary health care in 
the sense that there was a limited supply of drugs because there was no money, at 
least not from the MoH, to import them. The only drugs that were available were only 
accessible by those that lived in the central areas of Mozambique, leaving the 
disadvantaged rural dwellers unattained. 
In 1995 the MoH together with a number of donors, namely the Swiss Cooperation, 
Holland and Norwegian embassy, had an intensive discussion about how alternative 
mechanisms could be found to best finance the pharmaceutical sector. In 1997 there 
was more uniformity in the ways finances were given and the MoH also had to be 
responsible in telling the donors in advance about the required drugs. Regardless of 
this effort from 1996 to 1998 there was still a considerable delay in the availability 
and utilization of funds, some of these occurrences took place because the MoH did 
not comply with some of the conditions that came with the finance. The increased 
dependence on donors is shown in the graph below. 
The importance of this graph is to show us that the source of funds in Mozambique is 
not a stable one hence the pharmaceutical sector cannot be stable because not only 
does it rely on imported drugs but also relies on unstable sources of finance. The 
expected amount of funds from the State's budget in 2001 varies in accordance to the 












Graph 6.3 financing the pharmaceutical sector 
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A very important note from the above graph is the fact that the Mozambican 
government depends on donors for more than 50% of their funds. In 1999 donors 
provided 81. 8% of the total financing for the pharmaceutical sector and in 2001 they 
financed 72.9%. In 2000 although we can see a drop in funds it is still above 50% 
(59.7% to be precise). This shows us the dependency on external financing from the 
Mozambican part. 
The following table shows us the extent of total expenditure on the pharmaceutical 
sector, which depends on the finances received in a particular year. 
Table 6.3: extent of total expenditure on the pharmaceutical sector for the past 3 years 
CATEGORY COST (US$) 1999 COST (US$) 2000 COST (US$) 2001 
Medicines 14,896 8,198 12,008 
Curgical material 1,961 1,627 3,774 
Oral health 0 332 231 
Injections 0 1,297 1,358 
Blood bank 0 994 292 
X-ray material 0 289 203 
Chemicals 1,820 3,195 2,052 
Lab. Materials 0 83 -
Others 463 16 516 











As we can see from the above table, the pharmaceutical sector spends according to the 
funds they receive; the only alterations that take place are where the money goes to, in 
terms of the different categories. The latter probably depends on what is needed the 
most at the particular time when funds are disbursed. 
6.4 Market prices of anti-malarial drugs 
In the public sector prices for antimalarial drugs are highly subsidized hence for this 
study the most important figure will be what government spends on the purchase of 
these drugs, other than the costs incurred by consumers; which are almost 
insignificant. As far as the consumers are concerned their main preoccupation lies 
within the availability of the drug rather than its price because the government 
provides for these at very low prices as compared to what they pay for it in real terms. 
Graph 6.4: Price list of drugs in public hospitals, 2001 
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Prices only change marginally. Actually, the only price difference in the past years is 
the exchange rate and inflation and if we incorporate the exchange rate we would 
notice that the price gets lower and lower every year. 
In general, all drugs are subsidized in government/public sector hospitals and 
pharmacies. There is 50% subsidization because looking at the figures above anti-











amount for these drugs. But what must be noted is that if an individual gets a 
prescription from the private sector he/she is not entitled to purchasing those drugs 
from the public sector. This is done so as to ensure that those that cannot afford 
expensive drugs do not end up without them in the public sector. 
The price paid by government on the purchase of antimalarial drugs is shown in the 
graph below: 





















As is shown in the graph, there is more money spent on the purchase of chloroquine, 
as this is the first-line drug treatment used in the country, particularly the public 
sector. Although quinine and fansidar are down the graph (probably because hey are 
not used as much as chloroquine, hence not purchased in large amounts), they still 
show an increasing trend from 1999 to 2001. In 1999 government spent less on the 
purchase of the first line therapy, probably due to exchange rate difference or 
probably caused by a decrease in the incidence of malaria but in 2000 the expense 
went back up. All these drugs are imported from abroad, as there is no local 
production of anti-malarial drugs. The next section gives us more details on this issue. 
6.5 Generic pharmaceutical companies 
It is important to note that there are no anti-malarial drugs produced locally; all drugs 











public provision. In fact~ there are only two drug manufacturers and these are private 
owned but also supply public institutes. These drug manufacturers only produce 
anaesthetics and painkillers and even so~ they are very insignificant, as they do not 
export them. There are thirty-three companies of importation in the whole country, 
and most of them are either Portuguese or Indian owned. The public sector highly 
relies on generic drugs and the private sector imports both original and generics. The 
level of parallel importation depends on competition and the Mozambican 
government buys from companies that offer the lowest price and quality. 
For many years at least until 1998, MEDIMOC was the only importer with 
authorization for the purchase of drugs in the country. This was due to the fact that the 
MoR lacked the capacity to provide for their NRS. The pharmaceutical department 
keeps all the information about the annual needs of stocks and updates these 
periodically. MEDIMOC assumed the responsibility for the central and regional 
storage functions while the MoR was responsible for provincial and district storage 
functions. Because storage facilities are generally in poor conditions and scattered, 
especially in Maputo, this contributes to problems of stock management and controL 
In 1998 the pharmaceutical industry saw a significant increase in the number of 
private pharmacies. The number of pharmacies increased from 75 to 133 and the 
number of import companies increased from 1 to 29 but all in all in 2000 only 19 of 
these companies started operating. There has been an overall growth of 77% among 
the existing pharmacies in the country from 1997 to 2000. 
The increase in pharmacies could mean an increase in the demand for drugs and 
because there is no local production this means there is an increase in the demand for 
imported drugs. If this is the case then Mozambique should critically analyze how the 
introduction of patents is likely to affect pharmacies in terms of high drug prices and 
if drugs are highly priced only a small number of the population is likely to use those 
drugs, especially because the demand for drugs depends on the finance available. 
Price is a critical issue for the accessibility of drugs in Mozambique hence the 
country's health officials should ensure that if there is any increase in prices due to 
the TRIPS Agreement, it should be a marginal increment; but the question is, would 











6.6 Drug Registration 
The current drug registration system has been in place since 1999 only, hence its 
implementation only started last year. Before this registration policy Mozambique had 
no control of entry of drugs, which means there was increased importation of drugs 
even those that are inefficient. The legislation 4/98 passed on the 14th January 
established a new judicial basis regarding the medication and the practice of the 
pharmaceutical profession. According to this new legal basis the registration of 
medicines was made compulsory for their introduction and trade within the country. 
Decree 22/99 approved the regulation for registration on the 4th of May. This law 
makes provision for two types of drug registration: 
(i) Extraordinary 
(ii) Definitive 
The extraordinary type of registration is a simple process of notification of the 
medicines existing in the market, which has to be done by licensed traders. This type 
of registration has a validity of three years but offers no right of extension or 
exclusiveness. The definitive type on the other hand is a normal process of 
registration of drugs, which should be complied with to acquire the authorisation for 
the introduction of drugs into the market. This type of registration has a validity of 
five years, has exclusivity and is renewable once approved. 
Only registered companies can apply for the registration of drugs in Mozambique. 
These companies should also have headquarters in Mozambique with specification on 
the name of drug, its pharmaceutical form, its quantitative and qualitative composition 
of active components, as well as the manufacturer. 
6.7 Likely effect for anti-malarial drugs 
Having looked at the situation in Mozambique with regards to its drug policies and 
financing of the pharmaceutical sector there is only one way of analysing the likely 
effect of this agreement on anti-malarial drugs. Depending on the way in which the 
TRIPS agreement is used, this could have a positive impact in some cases and a 
negative impact in others. This will be done through the analysis of different 
scenarios. The first case scenario will be that of the use of generic drugs, which is 
basically the present situation. The second case scenario will be that of the use of 











Although this paper is only looking at the public sector, it should be noted that 
changing the first- line drug in the public sector alone might not have a substantial 
impact. According to WHO (2000) the role of the private sector is crucial in ensuring 
that drug distribution systems reflect public health policy and that the recommended 
treatment is available through all types of health care outlets used by the population. 
The common anti-malarial drugs that should be considered in drug selection, as 
suggested by the WHO are many and varied and these should vary according to 
country cases; there is no uniformity in the selection of a drug policy: 
Here are some of the suggested drugs to be selected from; these have been randomly 






(v) R -coartem 
Combination therapy 
(i) Q+SP-quinine+ sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine 
(ii) CQ+SP-chloroquine+sulfadoxine-pyrimethamine 
(iii) MQ+ ASU -mefloquine+artesunate 
(iv) AQ+ASU-amodiaquine+artesunate 
The current situation is whereby Mozambique is using CQ as its first-line therapy and 
Q as a second line-therapy for severe cases of malaria. These drugs are generic 
medicines hence have very low prices. Some pharmacies provide for SP and AQ as 
well and these are also generics. These are not affected by patent issues hence there 
cannot be an impact, be it positive or negative, from the TRIPS agreement. 
The second situation is whereby after the implementation of TRIPS Mozambique is 
obliged to purchase drugs that are under patents, such as HAL and R, there will be a 
problem because these drugs are priced more than twice as high as CQ. These 











Graph 6.7: Costs of generic vs patented anti-malarial drugs 
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It is more than evident from this graph that the cost of drugs more than doubles in the 
case of patented drugs as compared to generics, especially as compared to the first-
line therapy currently used in Mozambique (eQ). The government will have to 
increase their expenditure on anti-malarial drugs after the implementation of the 
TRIPS agreement. 
Because of the continued increase of resistance to anti-malarial drugs in many regions 
of the world, with the resultant effect on morbidity and mortality, it is essential to 
ensure rational use of the few remaining effective drugs, to maximise their useful 
therapeutic life while still ensuring that safe, effective and affordable treatment is 
accessible to those at risk. This requirement has resulted in a re-examination of the 
potential of combinations of existing products and the development of new 
combination drugs. One of the factors against combination therapies is the fact that 
they incur higher costs. 
As we can see in the graph above, although the cost of a combination therapy is not as 
high as patented drugs (except for the patented combination therapy-MQ+ASU) it is 











deal with the cost of a combination therapy first before having enough funds to 
finance patented drugs. This situation does not only reduce access but also causes a 
significant increase in government expenditure for drugs. Although there is a 
possibility that prices may lower as demand increases, these will never be priced as 
low as CQ and SP. 
It should not be excluded though that the TRIPS agreement does not and should not 
prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health; therefore TRIPS 
should not prevent Mozambique from using generic versions of patented medicines 
for the treatment of malaria. Even for cases of R and HAL, which are patented, there 
have been some negotiations between WHO and some manufacturing companies of 
. these drugs to introduce a preferential pricing arrangement for an adult treatment 
course to be priced lower than would have been otherwise. Even if this is the case, 
countries like Mozambique that have resource constraints will still lack the funds to 
finance these drugs because this reduction of cost will still be high in terms of what is 
spent now. 
This case still brings another situation, which is that of the reluctance of 
manufacturing such drugs, since they do not generate income for these companies. 
The incentive to invest in anti-malarial drugs therefore decreases and this means the 
situation in Mozambique and other Southern African countries suffering from this 
disease will continue. Many of the medicines created for the developed countries 
markets are equally important for developing countries. However, developing 
countries clearly have different drug demands than developed countries (Lanjouw, 
2001). Developed countries do not for instance, demand so much drugs for tropical 
diseases and developing countries do not for example, so much demand drugs for 
heart diseases; at least not as much as their counterparts. 
The diseases of the poor attract very little R&D efforts by the large pharmaceutical 
industry, since they do not promise to generate income. R&D is driven by market 
considerations. According to Correa, R&D targeting diseases found in developing 
countries is marginal. For instance, according to the UNDP (1999), of the annual 
health related research and development worldwide, only 0.2% goes for pneumonia, 











burden. It is important therefore to realise that the pharmaceutical industry may not be 
expected in real life, to distribute a lot of money in areas where their profits are low 
even if strong patents were granted. 
There is no visible increase in R&D for diseases such as malaria, despite the fact that 
most developing countries already grant product patents for pharmaceuticals and 
those that have not are still bound to do so. Although these industries are an essential 
part of the solution to health problems in developing countries this is still not the main 
instrument to bring the new medicines needed for the devastating diseases that affect 
the poor. Therefore, strong patent protection may be of little relevance for the solution 












DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.0 Discussion 
This discussion is an evaluation of the extent to which the research objectives have 
been realized. The chapter outlines the general conclusions derived from the study. 
At the current moment, producers with the ability and willingness to supply the world 
market with low-price medicines under patent in developed countries are principally 
located in developing countries, such as Brazil, China and India. These countries' 
producers have the ability to manufacture under local law in compliance with TRIPS 
because pharmaceuticals were not yet patentable until recently. Countries like 
Mozambique that do not provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products are 
currently allowed under TRIPS to import low-price medicines from Brazil, China and 
India because there is no TRIPS authorized export or import restriction. 
But the United States and other Members are pressuring developing Members to 
accelerate the adoption of patent protection on pharmaceutical products. These 
countries obviously promote the adoption of strong patent protection, and discourage 
an extension of transition timetables. The arguments that they put forward are the 
same as those we saw in the theoretical review of the justification for intellectual 
property in chapter 2. They persistently argue that patents encourage research and 
development on new pharmaceuticals; strong patents encourage FDI, and promote 
revelation of technical information. The argument to support the latter does not 
change 'if an innovator cannot use the innovation to provide a market advantage, 
there is a disincentive to enter the market, especially where others in that market can 
charge lower prices because they do not need to recover the costs of R&D, nor invest 
in new research and development '. 
But for a country like Mozambique, where is the gam of revealing technical 
information? How can a country without the capacity and infrastructural ability to 
manufacture drugs gain from such strong regimes of patent protection. They have 











such benefits mentioned above will occur to them. This country has relied on the 
importation of drugs for a very long time and such a change, although not clearly 
obvious now, is not likely to bring any fruitful gains for this country. Mozambique 
does not have the human, financial, let alone intellectual resources to produce 
pharmaceutical products of immediate need for their most persevering diseases. Full 
drug development is expensive and currently unrealistic for Mozambique; the latter is 
not research- based. As we have seen in the last chapter, this country relies heavily on 
others for financial resources and material resources hence if there is any changes that 
should be done it has to be done in light steps and not drastically. 
Although Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement states that an innovator must disclose 
all the technical details of the invention with the intention of encouraging the flow of 
information to the public, including competing manufacturers, this is unlikely to 
benefit a country like Mozambique in the nearest long run. Mozambique is still steps 
behind with regards to technological advances that would enable them to put this 
information iNto good use. What the country needs is to know that they can get drugs 
at a reasonable price instead of means of producing those drugs because that would 
mean also getting human and capital resources to do it. 
According to Maskus (2000) "it is demonstrable that as countries reach higher levels 
of economic development they tend to adopt stronger patent protection but this does 
not demonstrate a causal link between patents and invention", This may indicate that 
as countries reach higher levels of economic development their tendency is to shift the 
allocation of capital toward the development of new technologies and that as capital is 
shifted into R&D, investors seek to protect their capital investments with patents. 
The TRIPS Agreement does not particularly promote the affordability of medicines, 
other than by allowing Members to grant compulsory licenses when prices charges by 
patent holders are too high, by permitting the authorization of parallel importation and 
by recognizing the right of Members to enforce competition law, such as price control 
measures (but this does not assure that drugs will be made available). But regardless 
of this, technology-dominating countries like the United States have threatened trade 
sanctions against WTO Members when they propose to grant compulsory licenses or 











countries, it is likely that developed countries are doing this because they are more 
concerned about the spill over effects of these measures to industrialized countries. It 
is for this reason that developed countries attempt to make the use of these policy 
instruments as difficult as possible. 
In the case of anti-malarial drugs for instance, where the WHO is negotiating a deal 
with manufacturers to provide the medicine at a reasonable price, what is likely to be 
unavoidable is a situation whereby manufacturers stop researching and investing in 
this type of drug because it does not render them profits if they have to provide them 
at a non-competitive price. Therefore, whichever way you look at it there is likely to 
be a disadvantage for developing countries like Mozambique. 
According to the UNDP "in defining research agendas, money talks louder than need-
cosmetic drugs come higher on the list than a vaccine against malaria. Tighter control 
of innovation in the hands of multinational corporations ignores the needs of millions. 
From new drugs to better seeds for food crops, the best of the new technologies are 
designed and priced for those who can pay. For poor people, the technological 
progress remains far out of reach", (UNDP, 1999:68). 
Also, the pharmaceutical industry has not, in the last 2 decades, suffered from any 
provable shortage of funds for R&D. For all these years pharmaceutical companies 
have invested a high percentage of its sales in R&D, and was one of the most 
profitable sectors in industrialized countries, mainly the United States. All along this 
was possible despite the fact that a large number of developing countries (including 
those with the largest pharmaceutical markets, such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India 
and Mexico) did not grant product patent protection at all during that period, or only 
introduced it during the 1990s. 
So, the question running through our minds is why it is so important now for 
developing countries to introduce patent protection. It may well be the case that the 
cost of R&D has gone up maybe because of new possibilities or it becomes more 
difficult to develop new products. But the rate of innovation (measured by the 
development of new chemical entities) is said to have decreased since the 1990s 











patents, these firms will be able to generate patent-based income almost universally, 
since basically the whole world is contributing or will soon contribute to their R&D 
budgets and profits. 
Even though the TRIPS Agreement allows countries to grant compulsory licenses for 
medicines under patent, no developing WTO Members has yet done it. It would be a 
good idea for developing countries to find out and address the reasons for this. One 
reason is similar to the one above, whereby governments may fear that potential 
foreign direct investors will react negatively to an environment in which compulsory 
licensing is allowed. Another reason could be due to the threat posed by the United 
States and European Union to Members that show intentions of _applying for a 
compulsory license. Besides all that, there are administrative procedures involved in 
issuing compulsory licenses and these can be rather bureaucratic and not very easy to 
manage, that is of course for those countries that have already established such 
licenses and this is not the case for Mozambique. Although they have all the 
intentions of making use of these, just the process of getting it started will be 
problematic. 
What we should not forget is the fact that a developed or developing WTO Member 
applying only Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, as the basis for granting a 
compulsory license for export or medicines would face a potential conflict with the 
express text of Article 31(f). This leads to a contradiction. The WTO Members that 
are able to take advantage of the compulsory licensing provisions of the TRIPS 
Agreement to supply essential medicines are the countries with the capacity to 
manufacture medicines under patent, and this may exclude the countries most in need 
of medicines from taking advantage of compulsory licensing. Mozambique does not 
fall into that category. 
The purpose of allowing WTO Members to grant compulsory licenses is to allow 
them to put public interests before private interests when the need arises. If 
developing countries' Members are not allowed from addressing public interests 
because of lack of local manufacturing capacity, the purpose of the Agreement in 
general and Article 31, in particular is in vain; which is a contradiction to the whole 











to take advantage of its public interest but its least well off would not. Also, it is hard 
to understand why developed countries negatively view the grant of compulsory 
license and parallel imports because these are unlikely to threaten the long-term 
viability of drug R&D. This is because developed countries' markets already provide 
a large amount of resources for R&D, and the pharmaceutical firms have had large 
sales in many developing countries, including the largest markets, even in the absence 
of patent protection. The contribution to R&D that could be made by some developing 
countries is insignificant in global terms. Africa for instance only accounts for around 
1.3% of world pharmaceutical sales (Correa, ibid). 
And as a matter of fact it is hard 0 understand why developing countries that are not 
producing drugs should adopt strong patent protection when in actual fact the 
pharmaceutical industry m the developed countries has devoted very 
limited/insignificant attention to diseases that are highly prevalent in the developing 
countries, malaria for instance. Additionally, there is nothing in the TRIPS Agreement 
that obliges this industry to use the increased patent profits gained from developing 
countries for research on diseases like malaria, prevalent in those less fortunate 
countries. 
According to Abbott (ibid) there is no public interest constraint imposed on the 
pharmaceutical companies with respect to the increased profits that will be made from 
patents extended by the developing WTO Members. There is nothing preventing the 
increased income from being spent on R&D for lifestyle drugs that appeal mainly for 
OECD consumers. In the author's words "the pharmaceutical industry is the 
beneficiary of an extremely valuable public policy instrument- the TRIPS Agreement-
and has not been made accountable for its use of the benefits. It is important to note 
that the role of patent protection in a country will be different depending on a number 
of factors, including the level of economic development, capacity for innovation and 
local market size; therefore to apply a one size fits all approach to patents does not 
make economic, political, moral nor ethical sense. 
Despite the fact that strengthened patent protection for pharmaceutical products may 
at some point in the future provide benefits to developing, there is no sound empirical 











developing countries. As is shown in the previous chapter, Mozambique relies heavily 
on importing anti-malarial drugs and there is no company manufacturing these drugs 
at the present moment. Therefore there is no possibility even in the nearest long run 
for this country to develop a new drug for which patent protection might be useful, as 
a general suggestion Mozambique has no reason to provide patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products other than to pay higher prices to OECD-based 
pharmaceutical companies. OECD-based companies do not generally invest in 
diseases principally affecting countries like Mozambique, such that higher prices paid 
or drugs will benefit these countries in a very remote way. The likely result of 
introducing patents on pharmaceuticals in Mozambique will be to reduce the number 
of individuals who can afford to buy them because government as the main provider 
will not have sufficient funds to import all the needed drugs. 
According to Correa (200 1) the public sector contributes significantly to 
pharmaceutical research, including the discovery and/or development of many 
important drugs. The public sector role is not substantially dependant on the 
availability of IPRs. For many university inventions, for instance, that were funded 
with public monies the results of research would be published in any case. Firms in 
many cases would have the incentive to work with and develop what comes out of 
university research. They usually can patent the developments, or gain the advantage 
of a head start on the market, or both. No ex-ante grant of an exclusive license is 
needed to motivate this work. Traditionally the award of the patent has come after 
something useful has been achieved, rather than well before that stage. Conclusively, 
a significant part of pharmaceutical R&D is not directly dependant on the availability 
of IPRs, since invention undertaken by public laboratories would take place in any 
case. But this is not to say manufacturing companies do not face substantial costs to 
commercialize academic research. 
In terms of pricing, according to GoUin (200 1) to address the problem of access to 
medicine in poor countries, it is necessary to address the pricing of the medicines and 
this is where differential pricing comes into play to rescue these countries. He argues 
that there are many approaches to bring prices down, for instance in the case of 











company (Cipla) offered to provide triple therapy for these patients for less than $600 
per year, and an innovator company reduced its prices even lower than that. 
What the author is trying to put into argument here is the fact that price is a highly 
negotiable and negotiated term in any transaction, whether between private 
enterprises or between private company and a government regulator. In Gollin's 
words, "as a negotiated term, pricing is subject to bargaining power, and the more 
bargaining power that poor countries have, the lower a price they will be able to 
negotiate". This means that tools like compulsory licenses and the expansion of 
generic manufacturing, as well as negotiations with original manufacturers can help 
bring down the price of drugs in poor countries. 
7.1 Recommendations 
In light of the existing situation, no developing country that wishes to have access to 
low price medicines under patent elsewhere should provide patent protection for 
pharmaceuticals. But this might have some externalities for both the pharmaceutical 
sector and other business sectors; for instance the likely side effects might be in the 
form of trade-restrictions. The TRIPS council should be directed to undertake an 
objective in depth study, in cooperation with the Word Health Organization, of the 
effects of the TRIPS Agreement on the prices of pharmaceuticals, the identity of the 
beneficiaries of pharmaceutical patent protection, and the level and direction of 
research by those beneficiaries. 
The TRIPS Agreement should address the issues of compulsory licensing more 
transparently whereby there is no situation where commercial investors are at more 
advantage than public health concerns. It should be clear that commercial investors 
recognize the risks posed by public health threats such as malaria, and should not see 
a compulsory license given to redress such a crisis as evidence of a risk to general 
commercial investment. There is a need to overcome any kind of obstacles that makes 
the granting of compulsory license to address public health crises fast and cheap. 
Developing countries should get together and seek a firm commitment with drug 











It looks like not much can be done with regards to the strengthening of patents hence 
given this fact compulsory licenses might be the only way out for developing 
countries. Even developing countries that are currently capacitated to export off-
patented drugs will lose that capacity with regards to newly developed patented drugs. 
When this happens, affordable access to on-patent drugs in developing countries will 
become highly dependent on compulsory licensing. 
If the prices of drugs offered by patent holders are too high relief will be sought 
through the issuance of compulsory licenses. It does not look like Mozambique can do 
much on its own in terms of solving the problem that is foreseen after implementing 
the TRIPS Agreement. There is a need for SADC countries to negotiate collectively in 
order to increase bargaining power. It seems fundamental for developing countries to 
establish a joint position; a position founded on the demand for a balance of rights. 
These countries might join together to work on the recognition of patents. Through a 
co-operative venture, patents could be examined and not accepted blindly on the word 
of the US or EU as to their satisfaction. In addition, SADC could pool its resources to 
deal with trade law, patents, and the complicated legal cases that are still to come in 
the near future. 
Even though it is impossible to explicitly quantify the serious implications for the 
pharmaceutical sector in general, and anti-malarial drugs in particular, it is essential 
that everyone involved in this sector should understand what is at stake. The 
Mozambican national drugs policies should define strategies and guidelines today for 
the new regulations on patents. Governments and international organizations must 
engage in dialogues regarding trade agreements and health care technologies. Maybe 
national governments should be included in WTO consultations that have a direct 
bearing on health, such as the TRIPS Agreement. 
7.2 Conclusion 
The future development of new drugs is in the hands of the pharmaceutical industry 
but some assumptions made with regard to pharmaceutical R&D and the patent 
system need to be looked at objectively. It seems quite evident that commercially 
driven R&D organizations are unlikely to provide solutions for the diseases that 











compulsory licenses and parallel imports in its national law as a mechanism to lessen 
the market power given to patent owners. The use of these safeguards may make it 
easier for Mozambique to have access to patented drugs and to generics after the 
expiration of the relevant patents. There is no conclusive evidence that this measure 
will cause any harm to the funding of future R&D let alone affect the global R&D as 
a whole. 
According to Correa most of the R&D made by large pharmaceutical companies is 
not for the development of new drugs but is for substitutes to competitor's drugs with 
the intention of extending their monopolistic position that patents give them. And if 
the commercial interests of the patent owner are the only ones taken into 
consideration then the intended objectives of the Agreement is defeated. But this is 
only a problem where minor changes of new drugs are accepted for patents and in 
most cases they are not. 
The TRIPS Agreement must be seen as a way in which public health can be achieved 
through the incentive to innovate. In other words, the objectives of the patent system 
cannot be fulfilled if it only serves to make innovation that will benefit those who 
control the innovations. In Abbott's words "the TRIPS Agreement is not only about 
protecting pharmaceutical industry profits; it is also about the health of the global 
economy, and about the health of individuals". 
If the Agreement is to benefit countries like Mozambique then it should abide by its 
objectives and purpose, which are clearly stated in Article 7 "the protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge", Conclusively, 
any opinion on this matter should be assessed critically because this is a very sensitive 












The way developed countries have been advantaged from the issue of TRIPS in 
general and IP Rs in particular is like having Manchester United playing against a 
. soccer team that has a few good players - and others who have never played the 
game. 
7.3 Suggestions for further research 
As shown in the first chapter, there were certain constraints that limited the study in 
terms of sample size and composition. As we saw the study was restricted to the 
public sector only but we all know that the impact of TRIPS will fall under the 
country as a whole and hence will not only be felt by the government and its Health 
Ministry. For such reasons therefore it is important for a broader study to be carried 
out, on a much wider scale with full coverage of the country. Such a study will help 
generalize the conclusions, without being too reliant on assumptions. 
Also, this study was only looking at the case of anti-malarial drugs, which could lead 
to a biased conclusion with regards to the impact of the TRIPS Agreement because 
most of these drugs are generics and those that are not are still under negotiation with 
different drug companies hence the case of malaria can still be solved without being 
much affected by patents. What would be more challenging would be to study the 
potential impact of TRIPS in the pharmaceutical industry as a whole, all drugs corning 
into the country involved. 
As a matter of fact, the whole analysis of the implications of the TRIPS Agreement 
for the pharmaceutical industry in Mozambique is merely the starting point for a 
continuing process. Ongoing changes in the structure of the economy, regulations, 
patent laws and a number of other factors mean that further study will be needed. The 
provisions of TRIPS with relation to patentability, the effects of protection or term os 
patents, transitional period arrangements, compulsory licensing and parallel 
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SECTION 1: WTO/TRIPS IN MOZAMBIQUE 
I.Has Mozambique started implementing the TRIPS agreement? 
)(es ~o -----
a) If yes, when was it first implemented? 
b) if not, when will it be implemented? 
c) ifnot, what is being planned? 
d) Have there been any obstacles? 
2. What provisions of the TRIPS agreement are incorporated into the national 
legislation? 
3. What national priorities and policies does the proposed implementation take into 
account? 
4.Are there policy instruments outside the intellectual property rights that are used to 
address issues of prices of anti-malarial drugs e.g price controls? 
5. What are the TRIPS safeguards that are provided for under the agreement that the 
government has adopted or intends to adopt and how are these safeguards being 
utilised or how will they be utilised, e.g. compulsory licence? 
6.What is the current policy situation with regard to parallel importation? 
7.How could the exemption criteria be used in Mozambique? 
8.What is the future of the WTOrrRIPS agreement in Mozambique? 
9.What rules existed before TRIPS in relation to intellectual property? 
10. Is this change likely to affect the pharmaceutical industry (opinion)? 
SECTION 2: PATENT LAWS 
1. When was the patent law introduced in Mozambique? 
a) Has this law been amended since then? 
b) If yes, why? 
2. Are there any antimalarial drugs that are locally produced that are under patents 
3. What are the measures that the pharmaceutical patent authorities have put in 
place to monitor prices of drugs, especially antimalarial drugs? 












SECTION 3: THE HEALTH SECTOR 
1. What is the situation analysis in Mozambique with regards to the pharmaceutical 
sector? 
2. How are anti-malarial drugs financed in the country, e.g taxes, premiums, user fees, 
etc.? 
3. How does the drug financing differ between private and the public sector? 
4. What are the criteria for subsidization of the anti-malarial drugs provided in this 
country? 
5. What is the drug registration policy? 
6. What is the extent of the total expenditure on the pharmaceutical sector? 
7. What is the extent of total expenditure for generic anti-malarial drugs? 
8. Are there any anti-malarial drugs produced locally? 
9. How much does the health sector spend on patented anti-malarial drugs? 
10. What is the extent of parallel importation? 
11. What is the market price of anti-malarial drugs in the public sector? 
12. Any comments about the implementation of this policy? 
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